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1
Introduction?
Behavioral economics has improved the understanding of economic phenom-
ena by enriching the understanding of economic decision making with insights
from psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Rigorous empirical investigations
of individual behavior—which commonly involve the use of laboratory experi-
ments—have been at the heart of behavioral economics and have lead to new
theoretical accounts of decision making. The following three insights gave rise
to influential branches of behavioral economics. First, the context in which indi-
viduals make decisions often unleash behavioral influences that go beyond those
identified by standard economic theory. In particular, individual preferences com-
monly depend on contextual features, as has been highlighted by the literatures
on reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and de-
fault effects (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Second, individuals’ perception and
processing of information often does not live up to the high demands of standard
economic theory. Instead, individuals seem to employ simple heuristics (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974) and attention-based decision rules (Kahneman, 2003) in
complex environments. Third, while standard economic theory typically con-
strains individuals’ motives to pure self-interest, a more comprehensive view on
individuals’ behavior in social interactions uncovers that individuals often care
directly about the well-being of others as well as about how they are viewed and
treated by others (Fehr and Falk, 2002).
This thesis consists of three chapters that each contribute to one of these
three building blocks of research in behavioral economics.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the consequences of social reference points for
decision making under risk in a series of laboratory experiments. In the main ex-
periment, decision makers observe the predetermined earnings of peer subjects
before making a risky choice. I exogenously manipulate peers’ earnings and find
a significant treatment effect: decision makers make riskier choices in case of
? I would like to thank Holger Gerhardt for outstanding TeXnical assistance and numerous
helpful comments.
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larger peers’ earnings. The treatment effect is consistent with the predictions of
a model featuring social-comparison–based reference points and loss aversion.
In two control experiments, I demonstrate that nonsocial—e.g., expectations-
based—reference points do not explain the treatment effect.
In Chapter 3, I present novel results on individuals’ intertemporal choices in
joint work with Holger Gerhardt and Louis Strang. Our findings cannot be ex-
plained by exponential and hyperbolic discounting, the canonical approaches
to intertemporal decision making in economics, but are consistent with an
attention-based approach to intertemporal decision making that is based on con-
centration bias. In particular, we provide causal evidence from novel lab exper-
iments that intertemporal choices are systematically affected by whether con-
sequences of intertemporal choice are concentrated in few or dispersed over
multiple periods: (i) Individuals are less patient in the case that the advantages
of patient behavior are dispersed over many future periods than when they are
concentrated in a single future period. (ii) Individuals are more patient in the
case that the disadvantages of patient behavior are dispersed over multiple ear-
lier periods than when they are concentrated in a single earlier period. Both
findings demonstrate concentration bias in individuals’ intertemporal choices.
Our results are in line with the recent theoretical model of Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013). Despite the prevalence of dispersed payoffs and costs in everyday life, no
empirical study so far has investigated whether spreading payments over time
causally impacts discounting. Our results suggest that previous studies may have
neglected an important channel that influences intertemporal decisions.
In Chapter 4, I study in joint work with Florian Zimmermann whether prior
experience of unfair versus fair treatment affects how much individuals trust
others? We provide causal evidence that trust is affected by prior personal expe-
rience of fair versus unfair treatment by an unrelated third party. We compare
the willingness to trust of subjects in a lab experiment after they experienced
either being paid or not being paid for a real-effort task by a peer subject. Af-
ter being paid, subjects’ willingness to trust is substantially higher relative to
subjects who were not paid previously. Importantly, this treatment effect holds
despite the fact that subjects knew the exact frequency with which subjects over-
all got paid or did not get paid, such that the personal experience of fair versus
unfair treatment did not provide additional information regarding the subse-
quent interaction. Rational learning hence cannot explain the treatment effect
on trust. By employing a control experiment, we show that the effect of expe-
riencing fair versus unfair treatment on trust does also not result from income
effects: when subjects were paid based on a coin toss, subjects’ willingness to
trust was similar to subjects who where not paid based on a coin toss.
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In summary, this thesis documents effects on individual behavior that are
not predicted by standard economic theory, but underscore the relevance of be-
havioral economics for our understanding of economic decision making.
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2Social Reference Points
and Risk Taking?
2.1 Introduction
Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal prospect theory, the power-
ful insights of reference-dependent preferences have enriched the toolbox of
economists in understanding individual behavior. The fundamental insight be-
hind reference dependence is that individuals evaluate their obtained outcomes
relative to a reference point. Outcomes that are superior to the reference point
are perceived as gains, and inferior outcomes as losses. The essential feature of
reference-dependent preference models is loss aversion: Losses have a more pro-
nounced negative effect on utility than equal-sized gains have a positive effect.
The key question in the literature on reference-dependent preferences
is: what determines the reference point? Behavioral predictions of reference-
dependent preference models are highly sensitive to the specification of the ref-
erence point, which constitute what individuals perceive as losses or gains. So far,
reference points based on the status-quo and expected outcomes have been stud-
? I am deeply grateful to Steffen Altmann, Sebastian Kube, Matthias Wibral, Florian Zimmer-
mann, and, especially, Armin Falk for their generous guidance and encouragement throughout this
project. I thank Johannes Abeler, Mitra Akhtari, Alexander Cappelen, Stefano DellaVigna, Thomas
Dohmen, Sebastian Ebert, Benjamin Enke, Erik Eyster, Urs Fischbacher, Holger Gerhardt, Lorenz
Götte, Andreas Grunewald, Ori Heffetz, Simon Jäger, Andreas Kleiner, Botond Kőszegi, Ulrike Mal-
mendier, Andrew Oswald, Gautam Rao, Paul Schempp, Andrei Shleifer, Dmitry Taubinsky, Bertil
Tungodden, seminar participants at Bonn, Bergen, and Cologne, and conference participants at
Münster, Madrid, Kreutzlingen, and Stockholm for their helpful comments. This research was
financially supported by the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and the Center for Economics
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ied predominantly within the literature. This improved both the understanding
of reference-dependent preferences and of many economic phenomena.1
In this paper, I contribute to this vibrant literature by studying social-
comparisons–based reference points. Surprisingly little attention has been paid
to such social reference points within the literature on reference-dependent pref-
erences.2 However, a rich tradition of research in psychology, sociology, anthro-
pology, and the literature on social preferences in economics suggests that social
outcomes are a reasonable source of the reference point. Not only do individuals
frequently engage in social comparisons (Festinger, 1954), but also individual
well-being often depends on social comparisons (e.g., Veblen, 1899; R. H. Frank,
1985; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Card et al., 2012). Moreover, the perception of
unfair treatment commonly arises from comparisons to what others have (e.g.,
Adams, 1963; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006).
The primary research questions of this study are (i) whether social reference
points influence individual behavior when individuals’ decisions affect only their
own outcomes and (ii) whether loss aversion around social reference points ex-
plains potential behavioral effects. By answering these questions, I contribute
to the literature on social preferences. In form of inequity aversion, social–
reference-point effects were studied in distributional games in which individ-
uals were directly responsible for their peers’ earnings (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). It remains unclear whether these results
can be generalized to decision making when individuals affect only their own
outcomes. Distributional games constitute decision-making contexts where reci-
procity (e.g., Levine, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), welfare or efficiency
concerns (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), and
prosocial image concerns (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009)
may obfuscate social reference point effects on behavior.3 Importantly, reci-
1 These include, for instance, risk taking (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rabin, 2000;
Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007; Pope and Schweitzer, 2011; Sprenger, 2015), the premium equity
puzzle (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2009),
the disposition effect (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Genesove andMayer, 2001),
the endowment effect (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List,
2014), labor supply (e.g., Camerer et al., 1997; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; Crawford and Meng,
2011), effort provision (e.g., Mas, 2006; Fehr and Goette, 2007; Abeler et al., 2011; Gill and
Prowse, 2012; Gneezy et al., 2013), price competition (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2008), contracting
in principal–agent settings (Herweg et al., 2010), soccer referees (Bartling et al., 2015), job search
(DellaVigna et al., 2015), tax sheltering (Rees-Jones, 2014), and marathon running (Allen et al.,
2014).
2 A notable exception is Linde and Sonnemans (2012), who tested whether prospect theory’s
reflection effect extends to social reference points and found no evidence for it. In contrast to
Linde and Sonnemans (2012), I study social–reference-point effects based on loss aversion.
3 For instance, giving in the dictator game and rejecting offers in the ultimatum game may
result from an aversion against unequal outcomes. However, the former is also consistent with
prosocial image concerns and the latter with reciprocating perceived unfair treatment.
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procity, efficiency concerns, and prosocial image concerns do not predict social–
reference-point effects on behavior when individuals affect only their own out-
comes. By contrast, loss aversion around social reference points predicts behav-
ioral effects.
I focus on decision making under risk to study social reference point effects.
Risk taking is an important dimension of economic decision making (Dohmen
et al., 2011). Understanding the determinants of risk taking is a fundamental
interest of economic research. Additionally, the study of reference-dependent
preferences in economics emerged around empirical investigations of risk taking.
This paper employs a novel laboratory experiment that allows to provide
causal evidence on whether social reference point affect risk taking and tests
loss aversion around social reference points. In doing so, I address four criti-
cal challenges. First, I induce social reference points to individuals who make
a risky decision. Second, I exogenously vary the level of social reference points
between two treatments, HI and LO. Third, decision-making subjects are able
to avoid earning less than their peer by making different risky choices between
HI and LO treatments. Fourth, I employ two control experiments that allow to
test alternative explanations based on nonsocial—e.g., expectations–based—
reference points.
In each session of the main experiment, a single decision making subject
observed the predetermined earnings, s, of a single peer subject before making
a risky choice. The risky choice allowed the decision maker to choose a binary
lottery from a set of lotteries. Essentially, decision makers chose an upside pay-
ment between €3 and €16.5. The larger the decision maker chose this upside to
be, the lower was the likelihood of receiving it. The downside of each lottery was
no payment. Subjects could choose riskier lotteries—combining larger upsides
with lower likelihoods of receiving them—or less risky lotteries—combining
lower upsides with higher upside likelihoods. Ultimately, this choice involved a
trade-off between the size of the upside and its likelihood.
In a between-subject design, I varied the predetermined earnings of the peer
between sHI = €8 (HI treatment) and sLO = €2 (LO). Since there were only 2
subjects—one decision maker and one peer—present in the lab per experimen-
tal session, peers’ earnings served as a natural comparison standard. In that
sense the design allowed me to induce relevant social reference points to the
risk-taking subjects. Additionally, decision makers knew that their outcomes and
risky choices would never be revealed to their peers.
To derive predictions, I formalize the impact of peer earnings on risk tak-
ing in a simple model featuring social-comparisons–based reference points and
loss aversion. In the case that individual behavior follows expected utility the-
ory, no treatment effect on risk taking is expected, since decision makers face
the same risky choice across treatments. In the case that individuals evaluate
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lottery outcomes according to loss aversion around their peers’ earnings, the
treatment manipulation changes their risk-taking incentives: decision makers
choose larger upsides, i.e., riskier lotteries, in HI than in LO to avoid earning
less than their peer.
This is precisely what happened in the experiment: Decision makers chose
an average upside of €8.25 when their peers’ earnings were €8; and they chose
an average upside of €7 when their peers’ earnings were €2. This treatment
effect on risk taking is statistically significant and provides affirmative evidence
that social reference points affect risk taking.
However, an alternative explanation behind the treatment effect on risk tak-
ing may be loss aversion relative to expectations–based reference points—rather
than social reference points. Before decisionmakers knew their risky choice, they
only knew what they could have earned, if they had been assigned to the peer
role. These counterfactual earnings informed their expectations regarding their
own earnings, leading to potential differences in expectations–based reference
points between HI-LO treatments before decision makers were informed about
their risky choices.
Based on Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), expectations–based reference
points can, but do not have to, account for the treatment effect on risk taking.
Considering the timing of the experiment, the critical question for expectations–
based reference points is whether decision makers change expectations–based
reference points quickly in light of new information or slowly. If expectations–
based reference points changed quickly after decision makers were introduced
to their risky choices, then no treatment effect would be predicted. This fol-
lows from the fact that the risky choices are constant across the HI and the
LO treatment. However, the treatment effect on risk taking is consistent with
expectations–based reference points that do not (sufficiently) change after deci-
sion makers are introduced to their risky choice.
By comparing risk taking between the main experiment and two control
experiments that are discussed in detail below, I investigate whether the treat-
ment effect on risk taking is caused by social reference points (SRPs) or whether
it could also result from slowly changing expectations–based reference points
(ERPs). In the nonsocial control, SRPs predict no treatment effect on risk tak-
ing and ERPs make the same predictions as for the main experiment. The peer-
lottery control experiment is designed to reverse these predictions. ERPs predict
no treatment effect on risk taking, while SRP predict a similar treatment effect
compared to the main experiment. Overall, the results are in favour of SRPs as
the driver of risk taking in all experiments: There is no treatment effect on risk
taking in the nonsocial control while there is a treatment effect on risk taking
in the peer-lottery control. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of how the control
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Main
Procedure: 2 subjects
coin
toss
decision
maker:
peer: receives s
observes
receives
risky choice
performs
risky choice
Treatments: s = €8 in HI and s = €2 in LO
Conducted: in fall 2012, spring 2013, and fall 2014
Nonsocial
Procedure: 1 subject
coin
toss
active:
passive: receives r
observes
receives
risky choice
performs
risky choice
Treatments: r = €8 in HI and r = €2 in LO
Conducted: in spring 2013, summer 2014, and fall 2014
Peer-Lottery
Procedure: 2 subjects
coin
toss
decision
maker:
peer:
lottery:
€8 or €2
delay
of 5min
receives s
observes
receives
risky choice
performs
risky choice
Treatments: s = €8 in HI and s = €2 in LO
Conducted: in summer 2014
Figure 2.1. Overview of all Risk-Taking Experiments
experiments relate to the main experiment, and Figure 2.2 presents the main
results.
In the nonsocial control, I kept counterfactual earnings that inform expecta-
tions in place, while removing incentives based on SRPs. The critical modifica-
tion relative to the main experiment was that only one subject participated in
each session. A coin toss assigned subjects to an active or a passive role. Passive
subjects received the same earnings as peer subjects did in the main experi-
ment. Active subjects were given the same risky choice as decision makers in
the main experiment. In a between-subject design, active subjects learned their
counterfactual earnings (rHI = sHI in HI and in rLO = sLO in LO) before they
received any information on their risky choice. Based on these counterfactual
earnings, active subjects are equipped with potentially different ERPs between
HI-LO treatments—like in the main experiment.
I find no treatment effect on risk taking in the nonsocial control. While the
lottery upsides were slightly larger in HI (€7.65) than in LO (€7.62), this dif-
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Main (N = 132) Nonsocial (N = 134) Peer−lottery (N = 131)
HI Treatments LO Treatments
Figure 2.2. Average Risk Taking per Experiment
Note: The bars depict the average chosen upsides per experiment and treatment.
ference is not statistically significant and significantly smaller than in the main
experiment. This provides evidence that the treatment effect of the main experi-
ment is not driven by differences in ERPs that are based on counterfactual earn-
ings. However, these results do not provide evidence against ERPs per se. The
observed risk taking in the nonsocial control is consistent with subjects quickly
changing reference points upon being introduced to their risky choices.4
In the peer-lottery control experiment, the main experiment is repeated with
a critical innovation: Peers were endowed with a 50-50 lottery between €2 and
€8. Decision makers learned about the lottery endowment of their peers in the
beginning of the experiment. This permits introducing both €2 and €8 as coun-
terfactual earnings. After a delay of 5 minutes, decision makers observed a coin
flip that determined their peers’ lottery outcomes. Decision makers observed
their peers receiving €8 in HI and €2 in LO. Thereafter, decision makers were
4 Song (2012) shows that expectations-based reference points can change slowly as well. These
different results seem to be driven by Song’s (2012) emphasis on disappointment over not receiv-
ing counterfactual earnings. In his experimental setup, subjects expected a large lottery outcome
before arriving at the lab. When subjects ended up not receiving the large lottery outcome, they
increased their risk taking subsequently. In my experiments, decision makers’ counterfactual earn-
ings were revealed when they already knew that they would not receive them.
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introduced to their risky choice and chose their preferred lottery. If counterfac-
tual earnings affect slowly changing ERPs, ERPs do not differ between the HI
and the LO treatment. Therefore, ERPs do not predict a treatment effect on risk
taking in the peer-lottery control.
Decision makers chose larger average upsides in HI (€8.64) than in LO
(€7.44) in the peer-lottery control. This treatment effect is statistically signifi-
cant and significantly larger than in the nonsocial control. The peer-lottery con-
trol hence provides further evidence that ERP do not explain the treatment effect
on risk taking in the main experiment.
This paper contributes to the literatures on reference-dependent prefer-
ences and social preferences by documenting SRP effects on risk taking. These
treatment effects cannot be explained by nonsocial—e.g., expectations–based—
reference points. The main treatment effect on risk taking is consistent with the
qualitative prediction of the social-comparisons–based reference point model
featuring loss aversion. I discuss shortcomings of the model regarding quantita-
tive predictions that are not supported by the observed risk taking and present
simple extensions to the model that account for them.
My findings also contribute to the literature on peer effects. Loss aversion
around to social reference points formalizes relative concerns that are a promi-
nent form of how peers affect individual decision making. In this paper, I show
clean evidence for how relative concerns affect risk taking. In particular, I isolate
relative concerns from ERP effects and from other forms of peer effects, such as
imitation, social learning, and peer pressure (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Duflo and
Saez, 2002; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). For instance, Kuhn
et al. (2011) study car purchase decisions and find that (non-winning) close
neighbors of winners in the Dutch Postcode Lottery are more likely to buy a car
6 months after lottery winners were announced. This may be driven by relative
concerns or by imitation. Card et al. (2012) find that job satisfaction and job
search intentions are higher for University of California employees that were
made aware of the fact that they earned below the median. While this may re-
flect SRP effects, it is also in line with ERPs. Bursztyn et al. (2014) show how
individuals’ investment into a risky asset in a field experiment is affected by their
knowledge regarding their friends’ intentions to invest and their actual invest-
ment into the same risky asset. Bursztyn et al. (2014), however, cannot isolate
SRP effects as the driving force behind investment choices. Individuals may draw
utility from holding the same risky asset as their friends (Taylor, 2011) or expect
greater returns when learning from their friends.
The documented SRP effects also contribute to the literature on status con-
cerns (see, e.g., Ball et al., 2001; Heffetz, 2011). Status concerns include relative
concerns and public recognition or approval from peers (see, e.g., Heffetz and
R. Frank, 2011). For instance, Huberman et al. (2004) show in a lab experi-
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ment that subjects forwent material gains in order to win a contest that was
tied to a public victory announcement. My findings complement these findings
by showing that relative concerns matter independently of public recognition by
peers.
I proceed in Section 2.2 with providing evidence for social reference point
effects. I establish that these social reference point effects cannot be explained
by expectations–based reference points in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Evidence for Social Reference Point Effects
This section provides evidence that social reference points affect individual risk
taking. In the following I present the design of the main experiment and derive
behavioral predictions from a social-comparisons–based reference point model.
Then I report and discuss the findings of the experiment.
2.2.1 Main Experiment
The main experiment is designed to allow for a precise measurement of risk
taking after decision makers have been made aware of the earnings of their peer
subjects. Between two treatments, I exogenously manipulate the predetermined
peer earnings. A between-subject comparison of risk taking across treatments
allows identifying the effect of social reference points.
Two subjects participated in each lab session. Upon subjects’ arrival, the ex-
perimenter tossed a coin in front of their eyes to assign them to one of two roles:
decision maker and peer (called participant A and B in the experiment). There-
after, subjects received role-specific instructions in private.5 Peers learned that
they would receive a show-up fee and an additional payment of €s for complet-
ing a survey. Thereafter, they completed the survey and left the lab once they
were done. Decision makers, first, learned that they would receive a show-up fee
and that they could earn an additional payment for completing the same survey
their peers had to complete. Before receiving any information on their own ad-
ditional payment, they learned the show-up fee and additional payment of their
peers. Second, decision makers were told that their own additional payment
was not predetermined, but the outcome of a risky choice. Third, they learned
that their peers received no information on their behalf and would leave the lab
earlier than they would. Fourth, they were introduced to their risky choice. Fifth,
they performed their risky choice. Finally, decision makers completed the survey
and left the lab once they were done—which was by design 5–10 minutes after
their peers.
5 Appendix 4.A provides a translation of the instructions.
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Figure 2.3. Properties of the Lotteries
Note: The solid graph shows how the expected value of all lotteries varies in the lotteries’ upside,
x . The dotted graph shows how the variance varies in x .
All decision makers faced the same risky choice which is based on An-
dreoni and Harbaugh (2010). Decision makers chose their preferred binary
lottery (x(q),q) from a set of lotteries. Each lottery paid an upside of
x(q)= €16.5− €13.5q with an upside likelihood of q = i /100, for integers
i ∈ [0,100], and nothing instead. Thus, the set of lotteries entailed, e.g., a cer-
tain payment of €3, (€3,100%), an upside of €9.75 with an upside likelihood
of 50%, (€9.75,50%), and an upside of €16.23 with an upside likelihood of 2%,
(€16.23,2%). Decision makers chould choose riskier lotteries—that combined
larger upsides with lower upside likelihoods—or less risky lotteries—that com-
bined lower upsides with higher upside likelihoods. Figure 2.3 depicts what this
relationship implies for the expected value and variance of these lotteries. Ul-
timately, decision makers faced a mean-variance trade-off for lotteries with an
upside below €8.25.
I used a visual elicitationmethod that made it easy for subjects to understand
the lottery choice. Appendix 2.B provides screenshots of the decision screens.
In the HI treatment, decision makers chose their preferred lottery after learn-
ing that their peer received sHI = €8. The construction of the risky choice gave
them a chance to earn more (or not to earn less) than their peers. In the LO
treatment, decision makers’ peers received sLO = €2. The risky choice allowed
decision makers to choose a lottery that combined a higher upside likelihood
with a lower upside. This enabled them to avoid falling behind the peer.
The only variation between the two treatments was the level of the peer
earnings. Hence, a difference in the decision makers’ risk taking between the
treatments allows identifying the impact of social reference points. Our design
rules out the influence of other peer effects—e.g., imitation, learning, or social
pressure: decision makers did not observe actions of any other subjects; deci-
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sion makers did not affect peer outcomes; and decision makers knew that their
choices and outcomes were not revealed to others.6
2.2.1.1 Private Risk Attitudes
Between one and two weeks after the main experiment, decision makers re-
turned to the lab and received €8 as a show-up fee. In this second part, I elicited
their private risk attitudes, i.e., their individual risk attitudes in the absence of
any peer effects. I use this as a control variable in the analysis of the risk-taking
behavior in the main experiment. Each decision maker faced 20 price-list–styled
decisions. Each decision was a choice between Alternative Y , a certain amount of
money, and Alternative X , a binary lottery. Alternative Y was always €3. Alterna-
tive X was a distinct lottery for each decision. Along the 20 decisions, Alternative
X is getting more risky. Subjects started choosing Alternative X and switched to
Alternative Y at some point. I interpret this switching point as a proxy of the
decision makers’ risk attitudes. I classify them as more (less) risk-averse, the
earlier (later) they switched.7 Table 2.1 lists all 20 decisions.
2.2.1.2 Procedure
The main experiment was conducted in three waves at two office rooms of the
Bonn Graduate School of Economics in fall 2012 and spring 2013 and of the Bon-
nEconLab in fall 2014. By using two rooms, both treatments, HI and LO, were
conducted simultaneously. In total, 264 subjects—132 decision makers and 132
peers—participated in 132 sessions of the main experiment. No subject partici-
pated in more than one treatment (and in any other experiment conducted for
this paper). I invited only male subjects to keep the sample homogenous. Each
session lasted for 12 to 20 minutes. Subjects earned on average €8.5. The second
part of the experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab. All but 6 decision
makers from the main experiment participated (attrition rate of 5%). Each ses-
sion lasted for 10 to 40 minutes. Subjects earned on average €12.7. All experi-
ments in this paper were computerized using the softwares z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
6 In case pairs of decision maker and peer subjects knew each other, decision makers may have
anticipated talking to their peers about the experiment afterwards. Therefore, all decision makers
and peers were asked whether they had known each other prior to the experiment—which was
true for 5 pairs. All results presented in this paper remain virtually unchanged when focusing
only on pairs of strangers.
7 This price-list elicitation method allows subjects to switch multiple times. For subjects who
switched multiple times, the mean switching point is used to proxy their risk attitude.
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Table 2.1. Choice List to Measure Private Risk Attitudes
Decision Alternative X Alternative Y
1 3.40 euros with 97% or 0 euros with 3% 3 euros
2 4.08 euros with 92% or 0 euros with 8% 3 euros
3 4.76 euros with 87% or 0 euros with 13% 3 euros
4 5.43 euros with 82% or 0 euros with 18% 3 euros
5 6.10 euros with 77% or 0 euros with 23% 3 euros
6 6.78 euros with 72% or 0 euros with 28% 3 euros
7 7.45 euros with 67% or 0 euros with 33% 3 euros
8 8.13 euros with 62% or 0 euros with 38% 3 euros
9 8.80 euros with 57% or 0 euros with 43% 3 euros
10 9.48 euros with 52% or 0 euros with 48% 3 euros
11 10.15 euros with 47% or 0 euros with 53% 3 euros
12 10.83 euros with 42% or 0 euros with 58% 3 euros
13 11.50 euros with 37% or 0 euros with 63% 3 euros
14 12.18 euros with 32% or 0 euros with 68% 3 euros
15 12.86 euros with 27% or 0 euros with 73% 3 euros
16 13.53 euros with 22% or 0 euros with 78% 3 euros
17 14.20 euros with 17% or 0 euros with 83% 3 euros
18 14.88 euros with 12% or 0 euros with 88% 3 euros
19 15.56 euros with 7% or 0 euros with 93% 3 euros
20 16.23 euros with 2% or 0 euros with 98% 3 euros
2.2.2 Predictions
This section examines how subjects are predicted to behave in the main exper-
iment. I consider two cases: subjects do not or do care about their earnings
relative to their peer. The risk-taking context can be summed up as follows: de-
cisionmakers learned that their peer earned €s. Then, they chose a binary lottery
from a set of lotteries {(x(q),q)}, with x(q)= x − rq, q = i /100 for integers
i ∈ [0,100], x = 16.5, and r = 13.5. That is, subjects faced a trade-off between
the seize of an upside and its likelihood. Choosing a lottery over another with
a greater upside likelihood by one percentage point implies choosing a smaller
upside by €r /100. I set s = sHI and s = sLO for the HI and LO treatment, respec-
tively, such that
1
2
x > sHI > x = x − r > sLO > 0. (2.1)
This implies that lotteries with a relatively low upside are above (below) the
social reference point in the LO (HI) treatment. Additionally, the social reference
point in the HI treatment is “reachable:” Decision makers do not need to accept
extremely risky lotteries in oder to have a chance to catch up with their peer.
In the following, I discuss two approaches to deriving predictions for the
risky choices of the decision makers. First, I consider the standard model of
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risky decision making, expected utility. Second, I consider a social-comparisons–
based reference point model that features loss aversion relative to peer earnings:
decision makers have an aversion to earning less than their peers.
2.2.2.1 Expected Utility
The standard model of risky decision making assumes that individuals maximize
their expected utility, U(x ,q)= qu(x), under the restriction of x = x − rq. This
decision problem is independent of s and, therefore, predicts no difference in risk
taking between the treatments. In the case of linear utility in money, subjects
across treatments maximize their expected payoff with
x∗ = x /2. (2.2)
2.2.2.2 Social Reference Points
Second, based on the evidence that relative concerns affect the subjective well-
being of individuals Clark et al. (see 2008, for an overview), I designed and con-
ducted the main experiment under the hypothesis that social reference points
affect their risk taking. In the following, I examine a simple social-comparisons–
based reference point model to guide this hypothesis. The utility function of the
model uses piecewise, ex post comparisons between potential outcomes and the
social reference point, following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). I weight
the ex post comparisons between outcomes and reference points by the likeli-
hood of their occurrence, following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The model
abstracts from other forms of reference points, since the treatment manipulation
involves only social reference points.8 Like in models of reference-dependent
preferences, I assume that losses loom larger than gains and evaluations are
convex in losses and concave in gains.
Decision makers are modeled as evaluating a lottery by considering both
the “consumption utility” they derive from the lottery and the “social compari-
son utility” relative to their peer’s earnings. The expected consumption utility
is the expected utility of the lottery, i.e., qu(x). Assuming that utility is approx-
imately linear in x , the expected consumption utility reduces to the expected
outcome of the lottery, i.e., q x . The social comparison utility, µ(·), captures the
two ex post earnings comparisons, x − s and 0− s. For small arguments z, it
is assumed that µ(z) is piecewise linear: µ(z)= ηz for z ≥ 0 and µ(z)= ηλz
for z < 0. The parameter η≥ 0 captures the relevance of the social comparison
utility for overall utility. With η= 0, the expected utility reduces to the stan-
dard model that was discussed above. In the following, I focus on the case when
8 Section 2.3 discusses a potential connection between social and nonsocial reference points.
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social comparison utility is relevant for decisions, i.e., η > 0. The parameter λ
captures how individuals evaluate having less than others. For λ > 1, individuals
are loss-averse.
The expected utility of choosing a lottery with x > s is
U(x ,q(x) | s) = q(x)x + q(x)η(x − s) + (1 − q(x))ηλ(0 − s). (2.3)
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected consumption utility of the
lottery. The second and third terms are, respectively, the expected social gain
and social loss.
For lotteries with x < s, the expected social comparison utility collapses to
losses only,
U(x ,q(x) | s) = q(x)x + q(x)ηλ(x − s) − (1 − q(x))ηλs. (2.4)
Consider first the LO treatment. Because decision makers can only choose
lotteries with an upside above their peer’s earnings, i.e., x > sLO, they maximize
their expected utility of equation (2.3) under the restriction of x = x − rq, yield-
ing
∂ U(x | sLO)
∂ x
!
= 0 ⇐⇒ x∗LO = x∗ + ψ∗sLO,
with ψ∗ = η(1 − λ)
2(1 + η)
< 0.
Compared to the standard model of risky choice (with η= 0), loss aversion in-
duces decision makers to choose a less risky lottery, i.e., a lower upside. By de-
creasing x , decision makers increase their chances of “securing” an outcome
above sLO.
In the HI treatment, decision makers can choose lotteries with upsides above
and below their peer’s earnings, since x > sHI > x . Their marginal utility of tak-
ing risk is:
∂ U(x | sHI)
∂ x
¨
< 0 if x > sHI
> 0 if x < sHI.
(2.5)
First, assume decision makers contemplate choosing an upside that exceeds the
earnings of their peer, x > sHI. Equation (2.5) states that the marginal utility
of taking risk is negative: for any value of x above sHI, decision makers prefer
to reduce their risk taking—choose a smaller x—in order to avoid earnings
less than the peer up to the point that x = sHI. In the case that decision makers
consider a lottery with x < sHI, the marginal utility of taking risk is positive,
equation (2.5). This reflects the following: if decision makers choose a lottery
that leaves them in an unfavorable relative position, they revert to choosing the
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lottery with the maximum expected value. However, the lottery with maximum
expected value has an upside larger than the earnings of his peer. Therefore,
loss-averse decision makers settle at setting x∗HI = sHI. They modify their risky
behavior to match ex post earnings between their peer and themselves for the
case of receiving the lottery’s upside.
The model predicts that sufficiently loss-averse decision makers choose
riskier lotteries in the HI than in the LO treatment, i.e., x∗LO < x∗HI.9 In the LO
treatment, loss aversion induces decision makers to reduce their risk taking in
order to secure their favorable relative earnings and avoid falling behind their
peer from too much risk taking. In the HI treatment, decision makers choose
riskier lotteries to be able to “catch up” with their peer by matching their up-
side with their peer’s earnings. Based on this argument, my main qualitative
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1. Loss-averse decision makers choose lotteries with larger upsides in
HI than in LO, i.e., xLO < xHI.
Based on the discussing of how loss-averse subjects in the HI treatment be-
have, I also make a quantitative prediction:
Hypothesis 2. Loss-averse decision makers bunch at the lottery with an upside of
€8 in HI, i.e., xHI = sHI.
From Hypotheses 1 and 2 follows also the prediction that decision makers
choose lotteries with a larger expected value in HI than in LO. Loss-averse sub-
jects bunch around the lottery with the €8 upside in HI, which is close to the
upside of the lottery with the highest expected value, and choose lower upsides
in LO.
Hypothesis 3. Loss-averse subjects choose, on average, a lottery with a higher
expected value in HI than in LO.
2.2.3 Results of the Main Experiment
The first result supports Hypothesis 1. In the LO treatment with peer earnings
of €2, decision makers chose an average upside of €7. In the HI treatment with
peer earnings of €8, the preferred lottery of decision makers paid an average
upside of €8.25.
Comparing LO to HI, decision makers reduced their risk taking by decreasing
their average upside by €1.25—a marginal effect of 18%. The mean difference
in upsides between treatments is significant in an OLS regression. Column 1
of Table 2.2 shows the results of regressing the upside choices of each decision
9 Sufficient loss aversion is λ > 1+µ, with µ= ((x − 2sHI) / sLO)((1+η) /η). For instance, if
η= 1, then µ= 1/2 and λ > 3/2.
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Table 2.2. Treatment Effect in Risk Taking, Main Experiment
OLS: Logit: OLS:
Lottery Upsides Lottery Upside > 8 EV of Lottery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 if HI treatment 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.30*** 1.25*** 1.40*** 1.84*** 0.25*** 0.14** 0.15**
(0.35) (0.31) (0.31) (0.39) (0.42) (0.49) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Risk attitude 0.09** 0.07* 0.05 0.04 0.02* 0.02**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls for days, No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
time, and wave
Constant 7.00*** 6.00*** 5.25*** −1.31*** −2.01*** −5.07** 4.57*** 4.50*** 4.10***
(0.27) (0.42) (1.14) (0.30) (0.65) (2.14) (0.08) (0.12) (0.32)
Observations 132 126 126 132 126 122 132 126 126
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.11
Notes: Columns 1–3 show regressions of risk taking, measured by the chosen lottery upside, on
a treatment dummy (equal to 1 for the HI treatment). I added controls for risk attitudes to this
regression in Column 2 and additional controls for the days of the week, time of the day, and the
wave of the experiment in Column 3. Columns 4–6 present the results of a logistic regression to
test whether choosing a lottery upside larger than €8 is more likely in the HI treatment than in the
LO treatment. Columns 5 and 6 use the same controls as Columns 2 and 3, respectively. Columns
7–9 show the analyses of Columns 1–3 with the expected value of the chosen lottery as the de-
pendent variable. In parentheses are (heteroskedasticity-robust) standard errors. Significant at
the 1 (5) [10] percent level: *** (**) [*].
maker on a treatment dummy, which is equal to one for decision makers in the
HI treatment.
Result 1. On average, riskier lotteries were chosen in HI than in LO.
This coefficient remains significant when controlling for risk attitudes of the
decision makers (Column 2) and, additionally, for the day of the week, time
of the day, and the wave of the experiment (Column 3). This indicates that
the implementation of the experiment—most importantly, the randomization
into treatments—worked well. The risk attitude control variable is significant
(measured 1–2 weeks after the main experiment took place, see Section 2.2.1.1
for details). The positive coefficient indicates that subjects who are less (more)
risk-averse chose relatively (less) riskier lotteries.
Figure 2.4 shows a histogram of the chosen upsides per treatment—larger
values imply a higher willingness to take risk. Consistent with Result 1, the dis-
tribution of upsides in the LO treatment is statistically smaller than in the HI:
Subjects are more likely to choose less risky lotteries in LO than in HI. A Mann–
Whitney U-test (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) yields a p-value of 0.0001 (0.001).10
Reflecting the average upside choices across treatments, I find that decision
makers chose on average lotteries with a higher expected value in HI than in LO.
10 P-values in this study refer to two-sided tests.
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Figure 2.4. Frequencies of Risk Taking in the Main Experiment per Treatment
The last three columns in Table 2.2 show that this treatment effect is significant
and robust to controls.
Result 2. Decision makers chose on average lotteries with a higher expected value
in HI than in LO.
As shown in the previous section and articulated in Hypothesis 2, the social-
comparisons–based, reference-dependent preference model predicts that loss-
averse subjects bunch at the €8 upside in HI. However, there is no evidence for
“bunching.” Only 4 decision makers chose this lottery in HI—matching exactly
the respective frequency in LO. While Figure 2.4 seems to indicate that more
decision makers in HI chose lotteries with upsides around €8 than in LO, this is
not statistically significant.11
Result 3. Decision makers do not bunch around the €8 lottery in HI.
Figure 2.4 also illustrates that more decision makers chose a lottery with
an upside larger than €8 more often in HI than in LO. I test the statistical sig-
11 I test this by constructing a binary outcome variable which equals 1 in the case that
xˆ ∈ [7.59,8.4] and zero otherwise. A logit (probit) regression of this binary outcome variable
on the treatment dummy yields insignificant treatment differences. This remains to be the case
when I change the interval to [7.84,8.14] and [8,8.14].
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nificance of this difference in lottery choices across treatments by constructing
a binary outcome variable which equals 1 in the case of xˆ > 8 and zero other-
wise. Column 4 in Table 2.2 reports the results of a logistic regression of this
binary outcome variable on the treatment dummy. The estimation yields a sig-
nificantly positive coefficient of the treatment dummy: being assigned to the
HI treatment increases the likelihood of choosing a lottery with xˆ > 8 by 27%.
Columns 5 and 6 show that this result is robust to controlling for risk attitudes,
the day of week, time of the day, and the wave of the experiment.
Result 4. Lotteries with xˆ > 8 were chosen more often in HI than in LO.
2.2.4 Discussion of the Main Experiment
The findings of the main experiment suggest that decision makers consider dif-
ferent lotteries as desirable between LO-HI treatments. The desirability of lotter-
ies is driven by social reference points, i.e., peer earnings, as shown in Results 1,
2, 3, and 4. Lotteries with larger upsides, in particular upsides larger than €8,
are more desirable to the decision makers in the HI treatment relative to the LO
treatment.
The average upside and expected value choices (Results 1 and 2) are in
line with loss aversion around peer earnings. However, instead of bunching at
the €8 upside, decision makers chose upsides substantially larger than €8 in
HI. Importantly, upside choices above €8 are significantly more frequent in HI
than LO (Result 4) and they are implying risk proclivity as they are often above
€8.25. These findings are not in line with loss aversion around peer earnings,
which predicted bunching at €8. In the following, I discuss extensions to the
model that can account for upside choices larger than €8 in HI (and are equally
consistent with the observed lottery choices in LO).
Upside choices larger than €8 in HI suggest that decision makers aspire to
earn more than their peers. Such aspirations could reflect a direct preference for
earning more than their peers or a preference to receive the same overall utility
as peer subjects—who stay in the lab for a shorter time than decision makers,
see Section 2.2.1—with overall utility including the difference between the util-
ity of experimental earnings and the disutility of the time spent at the experi-
ment. Both aspiration accounts could be conceptualized by reference points of
decision makers that would not be €8 but a greater amount, i.e., €8+ γ with
γ > 0. While loss aversion around reference points ∈ (8,8.25] would predict up-
side choices of x ∈ (8,8.25], this does not hold for reference points above €8.25.
This results from the fact that loss aversion cannot predict risk-seeking lottery
choices. Additional assumptions would have to be made for these lottery choices.
Plausible candidates would be (i) that decision makers anticipate a utility jump
at the reference point and (ii) that the social comparison utility exhibits dimin-
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ishing sensitivity around such reference points with convex social comparison
utility below the reference point and concave social comparison utility above
the reference point.
While these findings document social reference point effects on risk tak-
ing, it remains to be shown that the observed risk-taking behavior does not
reflect nonsocial reference point effects. Decision makers may expect to earn
what they could have earned if they had been assigned the peer role. This
may lead to a difference in expectations–based reference points between HI-LO
treatments, which would be capable—together with loss aversion around these
expectations–based reference points—of explaining the treatment effect on risk
taking in the main experiment. In the next section, I investigate this alterna-
tive explanation by means of two control experiments. Both control experiment
provide evidence against the alternative explanation. Thus, the next section es-
tablishes further evidence that the treatment effect on risk taking observed in
the main experiment results from social reference points.
2.3 Social vs. Nonsocial Reference Points
The previous section showed that decision makers responded to social reference
points by taking more risk in the case of larger peers’ earnings. This behavior
is consistent with the predictions of a model featuring the social-comparisons–
based reference points and loss aversion, as presented above. This section in-
vestigates an alternative explanation for the observed behavior: expectations–
based reference points. Before decision makers knew what they would be able
to earn in the experiment, they knew what they could have earned, had they
been assigned to the peer role. These counterfactual earnings potentially inform
subjects’ expectations, which in turn influence their (expectations–based) refer-
ence points. Upon being introduced to their risky choices, these reference points
may adapt to the new information arising from the risky choice—or remain
unchanged. In case that expectations–based reference points do not change, de-
cision makers would have made their lottery choice with different nonsocial ref-
erence points between HI-LO treatments. Together with loss aversion relative to
such potential expectations–based reference points, this could account for the
observed differences in risk taking.
I designed two control experiments to test whether slow-changing, expec-
tations-based reference points could serve as a valid alternative explanation for
the decision makers’ risk taking in the main experiment. The next two sections
describe these control experiments and discuss its results in turn.
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2.3.1 Nonsocial Control Experiment
In the nonsocial control experiment, I removed behavioral motives based on so-
cial reference points from risk taking, while keeping the potential for differences
in expectations-based reference points in place. Thus, expectations-based refer-
ence points make the same predictions regarding risk taking—based on coun-
terfactual earnings—as for the main experiment. If the same difference in risk
taking between HI-LO treatments in the nonsocial control were to appear, this
would suggest that expectations-based reference points explain the treatment
effect reported in the main experiment. If, on the contrary, there is no differ-
ence in risk taking in the nonsocial control, this would provide support that it is
indeed social reference points which affect risk taking in the main experiment.
2.3.1.1 Design of the Nonsocial Control Experiment
The nonsocial control basically replicates the main experiment with an impor-
tant innovation: Only one subject participated in each session. The experimenter
tossed a coin in front of the subject to randomly assign one of two roles: active or
passive. Passive subjects received €2 in LO and €8 in HI. Active subjects received
the outcome of a lottery they chose from a set of lotteries. The risky choice is
exactly the same as in the main experiment. Before active subjects received any
information regarding their risky choice, they learned what they would have
earned if they had been assigned the passive role: active subjects chose their
preferred lottery while knowing that they could have earned €8 in the HI or €2
in the LO treatment.
The crucial feature is that both decision makers (in the main experiment)
and active subjects (in the nonsocial control) chose their preferred lottery in
light of the same counterfactual earnings. However, only for decision makers
did this constitute a social comparison in earnings. Active subjects were not
accompanied by peers to compare earnings with. Therefore, motives based on
social reference point were removed from their risk taking. However, potential
differences in expectations-based reference points were kept constant between
treatments. Active subjects knew what they could have earned, if they had been
assigned the passive role just as much as decision makers knew what they could
have earned, if they had obtained the peer role. This difference in designs allows
to investigate whether social comparison based motives explain the findings in
the main experiment rather than expectations-based reference points.
The nonsocial control was conducted in three waves at two office rooms
of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics in fall 2013 and in the BonnEcon-
Lab in summer and fall 2014. In total, 262 subjects—134 active and 128 pas-
sive—participated in 262 sessions. No subject participated in more than one
treatment (and in any other experiment conducted for this paper). Only male
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subjects were invited to make the results comparable to the main experiment.
Each session had a duration for 12 to 20 minutes. Subjects earned on average
€8.50. Active subjects were also re-invited to participate in a second part of the
experiment which measured their risk attitudes (see Section 2.2.1.1). The sec-
ond part was conducted at the BonnEconLab. All but 15 active subjects from the
nonsocial control participated (attrition rate of 11%). Each session lasted for at
most 40 minutes, and subjects earned on average €12.
2.3.1.2 Nonsocial Control Results
Figure 2.5 shows that active subjects in the nonsocial control experiment chose
fairly similar lotteries across treatments. This is also reflected in the fact that the
average chosen upsides were almost identical in HI and LO. In the LO treatment,
active subjects chose an average upside of €7.62. In the HI treatment, the aver-
age preferred upside of was €7.65. Additionally, across both treatments, same
frequency of lottery choices with upsides larger than €8 was roughly the same.
In the following, I present the main results of the paper: the treatment ef-
fects on risk taking in the main experiment are significantly larger than in the
nonsocial control. This allows to identify social reference points on risk taking.
I replicate Results 1, 3, and 4 in a difference (between main experiment and
nonsocial control) in differences (between HI-LO treatments) analysis.
I regress the upside choices of the decision makers and active subjects, re-
spectively, on a treatment dummy (= 1 if HI), on an experiment dummy (= 1
if nonsocial control), and an interaction term of the two. The coefficient of the
interaction term estimates the difference in differences treatment effect on risk
taking. Table 2.3 reports the results of such difference-in-differences estimations.
It turns out that the coefficients on the interaction term are significantly smaller
than zero. Thus, the differences on risk-taking behavior reported in Results 1, 3,
and 4 are significantly smaller in the nonsocial control compared to the main
experiment.
Result 5. The difference in risk taking reported in Result 1 is significantly larger
in the main experiment than in the nonsocial control. The difference in expected
values reported in Result 3 is significantly larger in the main experiment than in
the nonsocial control. The difference of lottery choices with an upside larger than
€8 reported in Result 4 is significantly larger in the main treatment than in the
nonsocial control.
Result 5 provides evidence that the treatment effects on risk taking of the
main experiment identify social reference point effects rather than nonsocial—
e.g., expectations-based—reference points. This evidence rests on the assump-
tion that potential differences in expectations–based reference points are con-
stant between the main experiment and the nonsocial control. This assumption
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Figure 2.5. Frequencies of Risk Taking in the Nonsocial Control Experiment per Treatment
appears reasonable, since in both experiments subjects learn about the same
counterfactual earnings. This holds, however, only if counterfactual earnings
that are actually earned by peers (like in the main experiment) are not more
informative for the expectation formation of individuals than purely counterfac-
tual wages (like in the nonsocial control). In the next section, I present further
support on social reference points effects on risk taking that is independent of
the discussed assumption.
2.3.2 Peer-Lottery Control Experiment
I designed the peer-lottery control experiment such that social reference points
predict a similar treatment effect on risk taking as in the main experiment,
while expectations—and thus expectations–based reference points—are kept
constant across HI-LO treatments. Thus, finding a similar treatment effect on
risk taking in the peer-lottery control would corroborate that social reference
points affect risk taking.
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Table 2.3. Comparing Treatment Effects between the Main Experiment and the Nonsocial
Control
OLS: Logit: OLS:
Lottery Upsides Lottery Upsides > 8 EV of Lottery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 if HI treatment 1.25*** 1.21*** 1.26*** 1.25*** 1.40*** 1.65*** 0.25*** 0.14** 0.15**
(0.35) (0.30) (0.31) (0.39) (0.43) (0.47) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
1 if nonsocial 0.62∗ 0.49 0.21 0.89** 0.93** 0.68 0.23 0.09 0.02
control exp. (0.34) (0.32) (0.38) (0.39) (0.43) (0.59) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
1 if nonsocial and −1.22** −1.17** −1.36*** −1.26** −1.37** −1.76*** −0.40*** −0.26*** −0.29***
HI treatment (0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.53) (0.57) (0.63) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10)
Risk attitude 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.02** 0.02***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls for day, No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
time and wave
Constant 7.00*** 5.45*** 5.26*** −1.31*** −2.87*** −4.28*** 4.57*** 4.44*** 4.48***
(0.27) (0.36) (1.02) (0.30) (0.53) (1.24) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20)
Observations 266 245 245 266 245 242 245
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.07
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 show regressions of risk taking, measured by the lottery upside, on a treat-
ment dummy (= 1 for the HI treatment), an experiment dummy (= 1 for the nonsocial control
experiment) and an interaction variable between the treatment and experiment dummies. I added
controls for risk attitudes in Column 2 and additional controls for the days of the week, time of
the day, and the wave of the experiment in Column 3. In Columns 4–6 present the results of
a logistic regression on a different dependent variable—whether the lottery upside was larger
than €8 (= 1) or not (= 0)—which repeats the analyses of Columns 1–3. In Columns 7–9 show
the analyses of Columns 1–3 with the expected value of the chosen lottery as the dependent vari-
able. In parantheses are (heteroskedasticity-robust) standard errors. Significant at the 1 (5) [10]
percent level: *** (**) [*].
2.3.2.1 Design of the Peer-Lottery Control Experiment
The peer-lottery control augmented the main experiment with a critical innova-
tion: Peer subjects received a 50-50 lottery between €2 or €8 instead of a fixed
€2 or €8 payment. The first information decision makers received was the lottery
that their peers were endowedwith. After a delay of 5minutes, the experimenter
flipped a coin in front of the decision makers to determine their peers’ earnings.
After learning their peers’ earnings, decision makers received information re-
garding their risky choice—the same risky choice used in the other risk-taking
experiments in this paper—and then chose their preferred lottery. The random
outcome of the peers’ lottery determined the treatment assignment of decision
makers. If the coin flip determined peers to earn €2, decision makers were in the
LO treatment, while they were in the HI treatment if the coin flip determined
their peers to earn €8. See Figure 2.1 for a comparison between the main exper-
iment and the peer-lottery control.
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Figure 2.6. Frequencies of Risk Taking in the Peer-Lottery Control per Treatment
The design of the peer-lottery control allows testing for social reference point
effects on risk taking while holding decision makers’ initial expectations—based
on counterfactual earnings—constant across HI-LO treatments. In both treat-
ments decision makers knew that their peers would be paid with equal chances
either €2 or €8. In that sense expectations based on counterfactual earnings can-
not vary between HI-LO treatments. However, peers still earn either €8 and €2.
Therefore, loss aversion with respect to peer earnings predicts the same treat-
ment effect on risk taking as in to the main experiment.
The peer-lottery control was conducted at two office rooms of the BonnEcon-
Lab in summer 2014. In total, 262 subjects—131 decision makers and 131
peers—participated in 131 sessions of the peer-lottery control. No subject par-
ticipated in more than one treatment (and in none of the other experiments
conducted for this paper). I invited only male subjects to keep the results com-
parable. Subjects earned on average €8.35. Decision makers were also invited
to a second part in which their risk attitudes were elicited. All but 9 decision
makers returned (attrition rate of 7%). Each session of the second part had a
duration of at most for 20 minutes. Subjects earned on average €12.5.
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Table 2.4. Comparing Treatment Effects between the Peer-Lottery Control and the
Nonsocial Control
OLS: Logit: OLS:
Lottery Upsides Lottery Upsides > 8 EV of Lottery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 if HI treatment 1.20*** 0.97*** 1.04*** 0.59∗ 0.44 0.71∗ 0.09 0.08 0.09
(0.30) (0.32) (0.34) (0.36) (0.39) (0.41) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
1 if nonsocial 0.18 0.04 0.39 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.06 0.2 0.13
control exp. (0.31) (0.31) (0.43) (0.36) (0.37) (0.55) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
1 if nonsocial and −1.17** −0.95** −1.01*∗ −0.61 −0.43 −0.75 −0.24** −0.21∗ −0.21∗
HI treatment (0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.54) (0.56) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Risk attitude 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.16**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Controls for day, No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
time and wave
Constant 7.44*** 6.31*** 5.48*** −0.63** −1.69*** −4.03*** 4.74*** 4.57*** 4.42***
(0.23) (0.42) (0.94) (0.26) (0.46) (1.46) (0.06) (0.12) (0.22)
Observations 265 241 241 265 241 240 265 241 241
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.03
Notes: In Columns 1 to 3 show regressions of risk taking, measured by the chosen lottery upside,
on a treatment dummy (= 1 for the HI treatment), an experiment dummy (= 1 for the nonsocial
control experiment) and an interaction between the later two. I added controls for risk attitudes to
this regression In Column 2 and additional controls for the days of the week, time of the day, and
the wave of the experiment in Column 3. Columns 4–6 present the results of a logistic regression
of a different dependent variable—whether the chosen lottery upside was larger than €8 (= 1)
or not (= 0)—which repeats the analyses of Columns 1–3. Columns 7–9 show the analyses of
Columns 1–3 with the expected value of the chosen lottery as the dependent variable. I state
(heteroskedasticity-robust) standard errors in parentheses. Significant at the 1 (5) [10] percent
level: *** (**) [*].
2.3.2.2 Peer-Lottery Control Results
The results of the peer-lottery control provide further support for social refer-
ence point effects on risk taking. On average, decision makers chose an average
upside of €8.64 in HI and of €7.44 in LO. This difference in risk taking is signifi-
cant in an OLS regression and significantly larger than in the nonsocial control,
see Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.4. Additionally, the average difference in expected
values between HI-LO treatments is larger in the peer-lottery control relative
to the main experiment, see Columns 7 to 9. While the likelihood that decision
makers chose upsides larger than €8 is larger in the HI treatment than in the
LO treatment, see Row 1 and Columns 4 to 6, this difference is not significantly
larger than in the nonsocial control, see Row 3 and Columns 4 to 6.
Result 6. Result 5 can be replicated in difference-in-difference analyses on risk
taking between HI-LO treatments in the peer-lottery and nonsocial control exper-
iments. The treatment effect on upsides, expected values, and frequency of upside
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choices above €8 is larger in the peer-lottery control than in the nonsocial control.
The former two are significant, while the latter is not.
In sum, these findings indicate that the treatment effect on risk taking ob-
served in the main experiment is caused by social reference points rather than
nonsocial reference points. When keeping expectations constant across treat-
ments and only varying social reference points, decision makers behaved simi-
larly relative to the main experiment.
2.4 Conclusion
Using a simple laboratory experiment, I provide causal evidence for social ref-
erence point effects on risk taking. Decision makers increase their risk taking
in light of relatively larger peer earnings—in the absence of any other social
motives and forms of peer effects. The observed risk taking is consistent with an
aversion against earning less than others. These findings provide clean evidence
that relative concerns affect human behavior.
The interpretation of the main experiment is substantiated by means of two
control experiments. Most importantly, when removing motives based on social
reference point but maintaining the potential for alternative explanations based
on nonsocial—e.g., expectations-based—reference points constant, risk taking
is not affected. Difference-in-difference analyses between the main and nonso-
cial control experiments support the interpretation that the treatment effect on
risk taking in the main experiment identifies social reference points effects.
The results of this study are applicable to the recent literature on the use of
relative concerns at the workplace (Moldovanu et al., 2007) Performance rank-
ings may incentivize workers to increase their effort in order to improve relative
performance—independent of additional pecuniary incentives. This study sug-
gests, that apart from effort, the willingness to take risk of workers may also be
affected by such social comparisons. Any principal that may want to make use of
social incentives should, therefore, take the potential effect on risk taking into
account as well. My results also suggest that even in the case that wages are
not made transparent through performance rankings, but individuals receive
private signals of their relative outcomes, behavioral consequences should be
anticipated by principles.
The findings of this study imply that salient peer outcomes affect the refer-
ence point of individuals. In my study, subjects were presented with one peer out-
come only, but in many applications, individuals observe multiple peer outcomes
(Falk and Knell, 2004). An interesting avenue for future research, therefore, is
to attain a better understanding, both theoretically and empirically, of which
peer outcomes individuals will find most salient or choose from as a comparison
when confronted with multiple sources for social reference points.
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Appendix 2.A Instructions
Main experiment, decision maker, HI [LO] treatment
In this experiment, your task is to complete a survey. Participant B completes
the same survey.
The both of you receive the show-up fee for your participation in this exper-
iment. Participant B receives an additional payment of €8 [€2]. You can also
receive an additional payment. Your additional payment is not determined yet.
Your additional payment depends on your decision-making before you start com-
pleting the survey.
Notice, participant B does not learn your additional payment and leaves the
lab before you do.
[next screen]
Your additional payment depends on your choice between different options.
One option is the certain payment of €3.
All other options are binary lotteries. Among all options, one outcome is 0.
You can choose the other outcome freely between a minimum and maximum
outcome. The higher you choose this outcome, the lower is the likelihood that
you receive it.
We use urns to display lotteries graphically in this experiment. If you choose
a lottery, then the computer randomly chooses which outcome you receive as
your additional payment. This happens at the end of the experiment, after you
completed the survey and are paid in cash.
Nonsocial control, active subject, HI [LO] treatment
In this experiment, your task is to complete a survey. If you would have been
participant B, you would have to complete the same survey.
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In both roles you receive the show-up fee for your participation in this exper-
iment. If you would have been participant B, you would receive an additional
payment of €8 [€2]. As participant A, you can also receive an additional pay-
ment. Your additional payment is not determined yet. Your additional payment
depends on your decision-making before you start completing the survey.
[next screen]
Your additional payment depends on your choice between different options.
One option is the certain payment of €3.
All other options are binary lotteries. Among all options, one outcome is 0.
You can choose the other outcome freely between a minimum and maximum
outcome. The higher you choose this outcome, the lower is the likelihood that
you receive it.
We use urns to display lotteries graphically in this experiment. If you choose
a lottery, then the computer randomly chooses which outcome you receive as
your additional payment. This happens at the end of the experiment, after you
completed the survey and are paid in cash.
Peer-lottery control, decision maker, HI [LO] treatment
In this experiment, your task is to complete a survey. Participant B completes
the same survey.
The both of you receive the show-up fee for your participation in this ex-
periment. Participant B receives an additional payment of either €8 or €2. It is
random whether participant B receives €8 or €2. A coin toss will be perfomed in
front of you to determine the additional payment of participant B. With heads,
participant B earns €2 and with tails €8. Please wait until the experimenter will
come to you to perform the coin toss.
[next screen]
The coin toss determined that participant B receives €8 [€2] additionally.
You can also receive an additional payment. Your additional payment is not de-
termined yet. Your additional payment depends on your decision-making before
you start completing the survey.
Notice, participant B does not learn your additional payment and leaves the
lab before you do.
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[next screen]
Your additional payment depends on your choice between different options.
One option is the certain payment of €3.
All other options are binary lotteries. Among all options, one outcome is 0.
You can choose the other outcome freely between a minimum and maximum
outcome. The higher you choose this outcome, the lower is the likelihood that
you receive it.
We use urns to display lotteries graphically in this experiment. If you choose
a lottery, then the computer randomly chooses which outcome you receive as
your additional payment. This happens at the end of the experiment, after you
completed the survey and are paid in cash.
Appendix 2.B Screenshots
Figure 2.B.1. Decision Screen of the Main Experiment and Peer-Lottery Control,
HI Treatment (Slider Position 1)
Note: The position of the slider indicates a preferred certain payment of €3.
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Figure 2.B.2. Decision Screen of the Main Experiment and Peer-Lottery Control,
HI Treatment (Slider Position 2)
Note: The position of the slider indicates a preferred lottery that pays €6.51 with 74%.
Figure 2.B.3. Decision Screen of the Nonsocial Control, HI Treatment
Note: The position of the slider indicates a preferred certain payment of €3.
3
Concentration Bias in
Intertemporal Choice?
Joint with Holger Gerhardt and Louis Strang
3.1 Introduction
Any decision that wemake has intertemporal consequences. These consequences
often stretch over numerous days, months, or even years. For instance, missing
out on exercising at the gym today deteriorates physical well-being each follow-
ing day; or aspiring to a bonus payment at the end of the year may animate
overtime work each day until the end of the year. According to exponential
and hyperbolic discounting—the canonical approaches to intertemporal deci-
sion making in economics—individuals evaluate a decision by aggregating all
its consequences into a weighted sum, with the weights reflecting their time
preferences. Individuals then choose the option that yields the highest sum.
Whether constant and hyperbolic (present-biased) discounting are sufficient
to capture all important aspects of intertemporal decision making, however, re-
mains an open question.
In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of intertemporal deci-
sion making by studying an attention-based approach to how individuals (mis-
)aggregate intertemporal consequences. The potential of this approach stems
from a pervasive characteristic of intertemporal decisions: positive consequences
are often concentrated in a single, attention-grabbing period, while negative
consequences are dispersed in non-tangible doses over numerous periods. For
instance, avoiding the hassle of exercising at the gym today marginally deterio-
rates physical well-being each following day; or the prospect of receiving a large
? We thank Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, Lorenz Götte, Johannes Haushofer, David Laibson,
and Matthew Rabin for helpful comments.
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bonus payment at the end of the year may come at the cost of working half
an hour overtime each day until then. In light of the evidence from cognitive
psychology that human perception is an important driver of individual decision
making (see, e.g., Kahneman, 2003), this asymmetry may give rise to attention-
based effects regarding how individuals aggregate intertemporal consequences
and, thus, how they make intertemporal decisions.
The attention-based approach that we build on generates an overweighting
of concentrated consequences relative to dispersed consequences. Thus, weight-
ing of intertemporal consequences no longer solely reflects time preferences à la
constant or present-biased discounting, but entails an asymmetric overweight-
ing of particular consequences. Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) recently introduced
a model of economic decision making that formalizes such overweighting. Their
model is based on the assumption that individuals weight the consequences in
a period the more, the greater the difference between the maximum and min-
imum consequences in that period. Take, for instance, the example of getting
a bonus payment at the end of the year at the expense of some overtime work
each day until then or not getting any bonus payment at the benefit of no over-
time work. The day the bonus payment is received is characterized by a large
difference between consequences: the bonus payment is paid out or not. The
days prior to the bonus payment are characterized by smaller differences be-
tween the consequences: little overtime work or none. Similarly, materializing
or avoiding the hassle of going to the gym entails a greater distance in conse-
quences today than for any later period, because in these later periods, each
gym attendance generates only marginal changes in physical well-being. In gen-
eral, consequences that are more concentrated—i.e., that are spread over fewer
periods—than equal-sized dispersed consequences imply a greater per-period
difference and are thus overweighted, according to the model.
Such concentration bias—when added to constant and present-biased
discounting—yields two testable predictions on intertemporal decision mak-
ing. First, individuals may behave overly impatient—relative to constant and
present-biased discounting as the benchmark—when concentrated positive con-
sequences of behaving impatiently precede its dispersed negative consequences.
For instance, suffering from a little back pain each day in the future may be
disregarded when this allows avoiding the attention-grabbing hassle of going to
the gym now. Second, when concentrated positive consequences of behaving pa-
tiently succeed dispersed negative consequences, individuals may behave overly
patient—relative to both exponential and hyperbolic discounting. For instance,
little overtime work each day may be neglected in exchange for receiving an
attention-grabbing bonus payment in the future. While concentration bias seems
intuitively compelling, there exists—to our knowledge—no empirical investiga-
tion of it yet.
3.1 Introduction | 39
We designed a novel laboratory experiment to fill this gap. In particular, the
design of our experiment allows us to investigate whether individuals systemati-
cally overweight concentrated intertemporal consequences relative to dispersed
consequences. In doing so, we test both directions of concentration bias: Do
subjects behave more impatiently when the negative consequences of impatient
behavior are dispersed over multiple later periods? Do they behave more pa-
tiently when the negative consequences of patient behavior are dispersed over
multiple earlier periods?
In our experiment, subjects were endowed with multiple earnings sequences.
Each earnings sequence specified a series of 9 money transfers to subjects’ bank
accounts at given dates in the future. Subjects decided whether to decrease ear-
lier payments at the benefit of increasing later payments. The sum total was
the greater, the more money subjects allocated to later periods. The larger the
amount of money that subjects decided to receive at later payment dates—i.e.,
the more they were willing to wait in order to receive an overall larger sum
of money—the more patient we consider them (see Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012)).
To test whether concentration bias affects intertemporal choices, we varied
within-subject whether the intertemporal allocation was exclusively between
concentrated consequences (CONC) or whether there were both concentrated
and dispersed consequences (DISP). Put differently, between conditions, we
changed the shape of the intertemporal budget constraint (the “intertemporal al-
location technology”). We test whether subjects’ decisions differed significantly
between conditions.
In order to investigate both directions of a potential concentration bias, we
compare intertemporal decisions between earnings sequences in CONCa and
DISPa as well as between earnings sequences in CONCb and DISPb, as described
in the following. In condition CONCa, subjects received a sequence of 9 dated
money transfers that were separated by several weeks each. We can express this
sequence as the vector
[1 + B (1 − x), 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 + RBx],
with the ith entry specifying the euro amount of the ith payment. R≡ 1+ r is
an interest factor (with r being the nominal interest rate), and B is the endow-
ment in the first period. That is, R and B denote parameters of a given income
sequence (e.g., B = €11, r = 15%), while x is the subject’s choice variable. By
choosing x ∈ {0, 1/100, 2/100, . . . , 1}, subjects decided what fraction of their first
payment they would forego in exchange for receiving the remaining fraction
plus interest at the last payment date. (For instance, with B = €11 and r = 15%,
subjects could receive €1+ €12.60 as the last payment).
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In condition DISPa, subjects received similar earnings sequences as in
CONCa. The only difference between DISPa and CONCa was that RBx was not
paid at the last payment date, but was dispersed across the last payment date
and multiple earlier payment dates. In DISPa8, for instance, c was dispersed
over the last payment date and 7 earlier payment dates. That is, the earnings
sequence given to subjects in DISPa8 can be represented as
1 + B (1 − x), 1 + RBx
8
,1 +
RBx
8
,1 +
RBx
8
,1 +
RBx
8
,
1 +
RBx
8
,1 +
RBx
8
,1 +
RBx
8
,1 +
RBx
8

.
This means that in DISPa, the negative consequences of impatient behavior—
i.e., of choosing a low x—were dispersed. In DISPa8, they took on the form of
small payments over the last 8 periods. In DISPa4 and DISPa2, we dispersed
payments over the last 4 and 2 periods, respectively. By contrast, in CONCa, the
negative consequence of allocating the entire amount to the soonest payment
date was concentrated, and thus attention-grabbing, at the last payment date.
Concentration bias, therefore, predicts that individuals allocate less money
to later payments in DISPa than in CONCa. Importantly, the present value of
DISPa is higher than that of CONCa. Thus, in contrast to concentration bias,
both exponential and hyperbolic discounting predict that the amount allocated
to later periods in DISPa is at least as large as in CONCa.
In condition CONCb, subjects received similar sequences as in CONCa. That
is, also CONCb involved intertemporal allocation of money between two concen-
trated payments. CONCb differs from CONCa in that subjects received B (1− x)
on the second-to-last payment date (instead of the first date):
[1,1,1, 1,1,1, 1,1 + B (1 − x), 1 + RBx].
In the associated dispersed condition, DISPb, subjects were endowed with
similar earnings sequences as in CONCb. The only difference between DISPB
and CONCB was that B (1− x) was not paid at the second-to-last date, but was
dispersed over the second-to-last date and multiple earlier payment dates. In
DISPb8, for instance, B (1− x) was dispersed over the second-to-last date and
7 earlier dates. That is, the earnings sequence was of the type
1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,
1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 +
B (1 − x)
8
,1 + RBx

.
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Consequently, in DISPb8, the negative consequences of being patient—i.e.,
choosing a high x—were dispersed, small reductions in the payments over the
first 8 periods. In DISPb4 and DISPb2, B (1− x) was dispersed over the second-
to-last payment date and 4 and 2 earlier dates, respectively.
For a comparison between CONCb and DISPb, concentration bias thus pre-
dicts that individuals allocate more money to the last date in DISPb than in
CONCb. By contrast, both exponential and hyperbolic discounting predict the
opposite effect: since the present value of the first eight payments is higher in
DISPb than in CONCb, the allocation to the last date in DISPb should be at most
as large as in CONCb.
The results of the experiment provide support for both predictions of concen-
tration bias. Subjects allocated, on average, 5.5%more money to later payments
in CONCa than in DISPa decisions and 6.5% more in DISPb than in CONCb. Both
of these effects are statistically significant in parametric and non-parametric
tests and correspond to an increase in “patience” by 9%, respectively. The effects
are robust to controlling for alternative explanations based on amere calculation
inability or small-numbers aversion.
Our results provide novel evidence in support of the focusing model by
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). While the focusing model is in line with many ob-
servations from the field (e.g. Warner and Pleeter, 2001; Davidoff et al., 2005;
DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006), it is hard or even impossible to discrimi-
nate between this model and competing explanations based on the particular
field data alone, since the ceteris paribus assumption is violated. By enabling the
manipulation of a single characteristic of the earnings sequences in a controlled
environment, our lab experiment allows for establishing a causal effect of the dis-
persion of consequences on discounting. We thereby contribute to the literature
in three important ways:
First, our results indicate that taking concentration bias into account en-
riches our understanding of intertemporal decision making beyond exponential
and hyperbolic discounting.
Second, it helps explain a discrepancy between recent experimental findings
and results from the analysis of field data: the observed degree of present bias
and the incidence of time-inconsistent behavior are fairly low in experimental
settings according to recent studies (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick
et al., 2015), while they have been found to be much more severe in the analysis
of field data (e.g., low gym attendance, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006);
resistance to the annuitization of pension plans, Warner and Pleeter (2001) and
Davidoff et al. (2005)). Our study resolves this discrepancy by identifying the
lack of dispersed payments in previous lab experiments as a plausible source of
this discrepancy.
42 | 3 Concentration Bias in Intertemporal Choice
Third, we contribute to the mostly theoretical and very recent literature in
economics that introduces endogenous perception effects to economic decision
making (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2013; Bushong et al., 2015). One particular impli-
cation is that one needs to be careful when interpreting the results of experimen-
tal studies that rely on multiple payments, like the novel method of “measuring
discounting without measuring utility” proposed by Attema et al. (2015). We
discuss this point in greater detail in Section 3.4.
We proceed in Section 3.2 with providing evidence for concentration bias in
intertemporal decision making. We provide robustness analyses in Section 3.3.
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Evidence for Concentration Bias
This section provides evidence that concentration bias affects intertemporal de-
cision making. In the following we present the design of the main experiment
and derive behavioral predictions based on the focusing model of Kőszegi and
Szeidl (2013). We then report and discuss the findings of the experiment.
3.2.1 Design
Ourmain experiment is designed to allow for a precisemeasurement of intertem-
poral decision making when decision makers face consequences over multiple
periods. In particular, each participant makes intertemporal decisions of differ-
ent types, i.e., with consequences that are either concentrated in two periods
or dispersed over multiple periods. Comparing how patiently individuals behave
between those two types of decisions identifies concentration bias. This allows
us to test the main predictions of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013).
3.2.1.1 Intertemporal Choices
In our experiment, subjects were endowed with multiple earnings sequences of
which only one was randomly chosen to be payoff relevant at the end of the
experiment (random incentive mechanism). Each earnings sequence specified a
series of 9 money transfers to subjects’ bank accounts at given dates in the future.
The earliest payment date was 5–7 days in the future. We describe the precise
structure of these earnings sequences in the following paragraphs. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 visualize the earnings sequences.
Subjects decided for each earnings sequence whether to decrease earlier
payments at the benefit of increasing later payments. The sum total was the
greatest, the more money subjects allocated to later periods. Put differently, we
implemented an intertemporal budget constraint with a positive nominal inter-
est rate, r. The more money individuals allocated to later periods, the more
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Figure 3.1. Budget Sets: CONCa and DISPa Conditions
Note: For the values of B, R, and w that we used, see Section 3.2.1.3.
patient we consider them. In doing so, we extend the “convex budget set” ap-
proach to intertemporal decision making introduced by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) to settings in which individuals face more than two payment periods.
We varied within-subject the characteristics of the intertemporal budget con-
straint between two conditions, CONC and DISP. In both conditions, subjects re-
ceived a fixed amount of €1 at each of the 9 payment dates to hold the number
of transfers constant across conditions. Subjects allocated an additional amount
of money between payment dates. In CONC, the allocation was between exactly
two payment dates. In CONC, the intertemporal allocation thus involved con-
sequences that were concentrated in single periods each. Decreasing (increas-
ing) a payment increased (decreased) a payment in exactly one other period.
By contrast, in DISP, subjects allocated between multiple payment dates. More
precisely, there was one consequence that was concentrated in a single period,
while the other consequence was dispersed over multiple periods. Decreasing
(increasing) the concentrated consequence increased (decreased) the payments
in several (2, 4, or 8) other periods.
CONC consists of two types of earnings sequences, CONCa and CONCb. In
CONCa, subjects could shift money from the earliest to the last payment date
at the benefit of receiving interest. In CONCb, subjects allocated between the
second-to-last and the last payment date. In both CONCa and CONCb, subjects
received B euros if they allocated their additional payment to the earlier date.
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Figure 3.2. Budget Sets: CONCb and DISPb Conditions
Note: For the values of B, R, and w that we used, see Section 3.2.1.3.
If they allocated it to the later date, they received RB euros, with R≡ 1+ r >
1. They could also choose convex combinations of payments by choosing x ∈
{0, 1/100, 2/100, . . . , 1} that determined an earlier payment of B(1− x) euros and a
later payment of RBx euros. While each payment date is separated by w weeks
in CONCa, this is true only for the first 8 payments dates in CONCb. The distance
between the second-to-last and last payment date was 7 months in CONCb. We
chose this large gap between t = 8 and t = 9 in order to minimize ceiling effects,
i.e., in order to avoid a situation in which people exclusively choose the largest,
latest payment.
DISP consists of two types of earnings sequences, DISPa and DISPb, that are
related to CONCa and CONCb, respectively. In DISPa, subjects allocated mone-
tary amounts between the earliest payment date and multiple (2, 4, or 8) later
payments. Thus, instead of receiving RBx euros at the last payment date like
in CONCa, the amount of RBx euros is dispersed over the last period and mul-
tiple (1, 3, or 7) earlier periods. In DISPb, subjects allocate between multiple
(2, 4, or 8) earlier payments and a single later payment. Instead of receiving
B(1− x) euros at the second-to-last date like in CONCb, the amount of B(1− x)
euros is dispersed over the second-to-last payment date and multiple (1, 3, 7)
earlier dates. The interval between payment dates follows the respective CONC
counterpart for each DISP condition.
In the following, we are interested in the comparison of chosen allocations
between CONCa and DISPa. This comparison tests whether subjects behave dif-
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ferently in the case that the negative consequences of behaving impatiently—
i.e., choosing a smaller x—are dispersed over multiple future periods (DISPa)
rather than concentrated in a single future period (CONCa). Concentration bias
predicts that individuals underweight dispersed consequences relative to con-
centrated consequences.1 In DISPa, the negative consequences of behaving im-
patiently are less tangible, as they are dispersed in small payments over many
periods. In CONCa, the negative consequences of behaving impatiently are con-
centrated in a single—i.e., attention-grabbing—payment. Thus, individuals are
predicted to pay more attention to the negative consequences in CONCa than in
DISPa, which promotes impatient behavior in the latter condition.
Figure 3.3 shows the decision screen of an exemplary decision with B = 11
and r ≈ 15% for both CONCa (upper panel) and DISPa8 (lower panel). Through
a slider, subjects chose their preferred x ∈ {0, 1/100, 2/100, . . . , 1}. The slider posi-
tion in Figure 3.3 indicates x = 0.5, i.e., the earliest payment is reduced by €5.50.
Since r ≈ 15%, this amounts to €6.30 that are paid at later payment dates. While
these €6.30 are paid in a single sum on the latest payment date in CONCa, they
are dispersed into equal parts over the last 8 payment dates—i.e., 8 consecutive
payments of €0.79—in DISPa8.
2 Concentration bias predicts that the dispersed
payment of €6.30 will be underweighted relative to the concentrated payment
of €6.30.
We are also interested in the comparison of allocation decisions between
CONCb and DISPb. This comparison tests whether subjects behave more pa-
tiently in DISPb than in CONCb. To reiterate, concentration bias predicts that
individuals underweight dispersed consequences relative to concentrated conse-
quences. Since the negative consequences of behaving patiently are dispersed in
DISPb, individuals tend to neglect them according to concentration bias. On the
contrary in CONCb, the negative consequences of behaving patiently are con-
centrated in a single—i.e., attention-grabbing—payment. Therefore, individu-
als are predicted to pay more attention to the negative consequences in CONCb
than in DISPb, which promotes patient behavior in the latter condition.
Figure 3.4 shows the decision screen of an exemplary decision with B = €11
and r ≈ 15% for both CONCb (upper panel) and DISPb8 (lower panel). The slider
position in Figure 3.4 indicates x = 0.48, which implies an additional €6.56 paid
at the latest payment date. While the remaining €5.28 (B(1− x)) are paid as
a single sum on the second-to-last payment date in CONCb, they are dispersed
into equal parts over the first 8 payment dates—i.e., 8 consecutive payments of
€0.66—in DISPb8.
1 This will be discussed in more detail below.
2We always rounded the second decimal place up so that the sum of the dispersed payments
was always at least as great as the respective concentrated payment.
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Figure 3.3. Screenshots of a CONCa and a DISPa8 Decision
3.2.1.2 Cognitive Reflection Test and Calculation Task
Concentration bias should be understood as a heuristic-like decision-making tool
that differs from deliberate contemplation over the advantages and disadvan-
tages—or benefits and costs—of an action. This suggests the potential for het-
erogeneity in the degree to which individuals are affected by concentration bias.
First, individuals that are less able to control their impulsivity might be more
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Figure 3.4. Budget Sets: Screenshots of a CONCb and DISPb8 Decision
prone to concentration bias. Second, individuals that are less capable of calcu-
lating sums of payoffs might exhibit more pronounced concentration bias. We
test for these two sources of potential heterogeneity by letting subjects complete
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and a calculation (mental-
arithmetic) task at the end of the experiment.
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The CRTmeasures the degree to which individuals are prone to let their deci-
sion making be governed by their impulses rather than deliberate contemplation.
We did not incentivize the CRT.
We use the calculation task to proxy individuals’ capability to aggregate con-
sequences. Since the consequences in this experiment were sums of monetary
payments, we asked individuals to calculate sums of strings of small and repet-
itive decimal numbers. Subjects were asked to calculate as many sums as they
could in five minutes. The strings were between four and nine numbers long; for
instance, subjects were asked to calculate “1.35+ 1.35+ 1.35+ 1.35+ 1.35+
1.35+ 1.35” or “1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71+ 1.71.”
We use precisely this calculation task, because it closely mirrors the type of ag-
gregation that is required for the intertemporal decisions that individuals face
in the experiment. For solving a string correctly, individuals received €0.20. If
they did not solve a string correctly within three attempts, €0.05 were deducted
from their earnings.
3.2.1.3 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two waves at the BonnEconLab in spring and
summer 2015.
In the first wave, each subject made 36 choices across different earnings se-
quences. One set of subjects (N = 47) faced 12 earnings sequences (w ∈ {3,6};
B = 8, r ∈ {20%,50%,80%}; and B = 11, r ∈ {15%,36%,58%}) of each of the
types CONCa, DISPa8, and DISPa4 [2× 2× 3× 3= 36]. A second set of subjects
(N = 46) faced the same parameters for CONCb, DISPb8, and DISPb4 earnings
sequences. In the second wave, each subject made 32 choices across differ-
ent earnings sequences: all subjects (N = 92) received four earnings sequences
(w ∈ {2,3}, B = 11, r ∈ {15%,58%}) of each of the two CONC and the three
respective DISP types [2× 2× (2+ 3+ 3)= 32].
During the first wave, experimental sessions took place on Friday. During the
second wave, sessions took place on Wednesday, Thursday, or Fridays. The earli-
est bank transfer for any earnings sequence was always next week’s Wednesday.
Thus, subjects’ earnings sequences always started 5, 6, or 7 days in the future.
Recall that we are interested in the within-subject difference of intertemporal
choices between CONC and DISP earnings sequences. Since CONC and DISP
earnings sequences always start at the same point in time per subject, the tem-
poral distance between the experiment and the first payment date is irrelevant.
Overall, subjects in both waves were also endowed with 24 (first wave) and
28 (second wave) additional earnings sequences. In this paper, we do not ana-
lyze these earnings sequences. The remaining earnings sequences also test con-
centration bias, but in a different manner. While these remaining earnings se-
quences yield similarly supportive evidence for concentration bias, they do not
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Table 3.1. Set of Earnings Sequences for Each Allocation Technology
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allow for the robustness check that we report in Section 3.3. We therefore in-
clude a more detailed description and our analysis of behavior for these earnings
sequences in Section 3.B.
Each session of the experiment lasted 90 minutes. Subjects earned on aver-
age €21.61. They were not allowed to use any auxiliary electronic devices during
the experiment. We used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) for conduct-
ing the experiment and hroot (Bock et al., 2014) for inviting subjects from the
BonnEconLab’s subject pool and recording their participation. Prior to their par-
ticipation, subjects gave informed consent and agreed to providing us with their
bank details (this prerequisite was already mentioned in the invitation messages
sent out to prospective participants via hroot).
3.2.2 Predictions
In this section, we examine predictions regarding individuals’ behavior in the
main experiment. We consider two distinct cases: subjects base their allocation
decisions on standard time preferences—discounted utility—or subjects are,
in addition, affected by concentration bias in the way specified by Kőszegi and
Szeidl (2013). Importantly, by discounted utility, we refer to any lifetime utility
that is time-separable. In many articles, discounted utility and exponential dis-
counting are treated as synonymous, while other authors use discounted utility
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as the generic concept and regard particular types of discounting, such as expo-
nential, hyperbolic, or quasi-hyperbolic, as instances of discounted utility. We
use the latter terminology. Importantly, the predictions derived below hold for
all three mentioned frequently used types of discounting and not only exponen-
tial discounting.
Subjects were endowed with multiple earnings sequences. Each earnings se-
quence C comprised 9 payments. For each sequence, subjects chose a share x
of the early payment(s) to allocate to later payment dates. Between the CONC
and DISP conditions, we varied the type of the intertemporal budget constraint
(one could also call this the “allocation technology”). Table 3.1 lists C for the dif-
ferent types of intertemporal budget constraints that we implemented. Prior to
subjects’ allocation decision x ∈ {0, 1/100, 2/100, . . . , 1}, each earnings sequence C
is, essentially, a set of 101 earnings sequences. Out of this set, an allocation deci-
sion x determines a unique instance c that specifies payments ct for the payment
dates t = 1, . . . , 9. For example, in CONCa, a choice of x = 0.5 implemented the
earnings sequence c = [c1, . . . , c9]= [1+ B /2,1,1, 1,1, 1,1, 1,1+ R(B /2)].
In the following, we assume that individuals anticipate to consume the pay-
ments they receive within the same period. This is an assumption that is fre-
quently made in experiments on intertemporal decision making (see Halevy
(2014), for a discussion). Given that the maximum payment was below €20
and that any two periods were separated by at least two weeks, this assumption
seems reasonable. Additionally, we make the standard assumption that utility
from consumption is increasing in its argument but not convex, i.e., u′(ct)≥ 0
and u′′(ct)≤ 0.
3.2.2.1 Discounted Utility
Individuals make their allocation decisions by comparing the aggregated con-
sumption utility of each earnings sequence c ∈ C . Discounted utility assumes
that the utility of each period enters overall utility additively. That is, utility
derived from the payment to be received at future date t can be expressed as
ut(ct)≡ D(t)u(ct). Here, D(t) denotes the individual’s discount function for
conversion of future utility into present utility. The discount function satisfies
0≤ D(t) and D′(t)≤ 0, such that a payment further in the future is valued at
most as much as an equal-sized payment closer in the future.3
The utility of earnings sequence c with payments ct in periods t = 1, . . . , T
is then given by
U(c) =
T∑
t=1
ut(ct) =
T∑
t=1
D(t)u(ct). (3.1)
3Normalization such that D(t)≤ 1 is not necessary in our case. Examples of D(t) are D(t)≡
δt for exponential and D(t)≡ (1+δ t)−γ/δ for hyperbolic discounting.
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Individuals choose how much to allocate to the different periods by maximizing
their utility over all possible earnings sequences available within a given set C .
We consider CONCa and DISPa8 first. In CONCa, individuals decide how
much to allocate to the different periods by choosing
x?CONCa(B,R) ≡
argmax
x
D(1)u(1 + B(1 − x)) +
8∑
t=2
D(t)u(1) + D(9)u(1 + RBx),
(3.2)
and in DISPa8 by choosing
x?DISPa8(B,R) ≡ argmaxx D(1)u(1 + B(1 − x)) +
9∑
t=2
D(t)u(1 + RBx /8).
(3.3)
Since D′(t)≤ 0 and u′′(·)≤ 0—as well as D(t)≥ 0, 0≤ x ≤ 1, b ≥ 0, R≥ 1,
and u′(·)> 0—the following holds. While the marginal negative consequences
of being patient, i.e., of increasing x , are the same across CONCa and DISPa,
D(1)u′(1+ B(1− x))× (−B), the marginal positive consequences are weakly
smaller in CONCa than in DISPa,
D(9)u′(1 + RBx) × Rb ≤
9∑
t=2
D(t)u′(1 + RBx /8) × RB /8.
This effect is driven both by the (weak) concavity of the utility function u and
the fact that in DISPa, parts of the positive consequences occur earlier and are,
thus, discounted less. Therefore, individuals allocate to later periods at least as
much in DISPa8 as in CONCa. This reasoning applies analogously to comparisons
between CONCa and DISPa4 as well as CONCa and DISPa2. Hence, collectively,
we have
d?a,8(B,R) ≡ x?CONCa(B,R) − x?DISPa8(B,R) ≤ 0,
d?a,4(B,R) ≡ x?CONCa(B,R) − x?DISPa4(B,R) ≤ 0,
d?a,2(B,R) ≡ x?CONCa(B,R) − x?DISPa2(B,R) ≤ 0,
with d?a,8(B,R)≤ d?a,4(B,R)≤ d?a,2(B,R).
In the following, let d?i denote the mean of all d
?
i, j(B,R) and xDISPi the mean
of all xDISPij for i ∈ {a,b} and j ∈ {2,4,8}. Thus, discounted utility predicts that
on average (across parameters B and R as well as DISPa8, DISPa4 and DISPa2
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conditions), subjects are at least as patient in DISPa as in CONCa, i.e.,
d?a ≡ x?CONCa − x?DISPa ≤ 0. (3.4)
The latest payment that is concentrated in CONCa is dispersed over 8, 4, and
2 periods in DISPa8, DISPa4, and DISPa2, respectively. Importantly, the latest of
the dispersed payments is paid when the latest payment in CONCa is paid. All
other dispersed payments are paid earlier, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Thus, a
large part of the later payment is discounted to a lesser degree than in CONCa.
Therefore, subjects are weakly better off in DISPa than in CONCa, if the same
amount of money is allocated to later periods. Consequently, subjects allocate at
least as much to later periods in DISPa as in CONCa.
We consider CONCb and DISPb8 next. In CONCb, individuals decide how
much to save by choosing
x?CONCb ≡ argmaxx
7∑
t=1
D(t)u(1) + D(8)u(1 + B(1 − x)) + D(9)u(1 + RBx),
and in DISPb8, by choosing
x?DISPb8 ≡ argmaxx
8∑
t=1
D(t)u(1 + (B(1 − x)) /8) + D(9)u(1 + RBx).
Here, the following holds. While the marginal positive consequences of post-
poning, i.e., increasing x , are identical across CONCb and DISPb, D(9)u
′(1+
RBx)× b, the marginal negative consequences are weakly smaller (i.e., greater
in absolute terms) in DISPb8 than in CONCb,
8∑
t=1
D(t)u′(1 + (B(1 − x)) /8) × (−B /8) ≤ D(8)u′(1 + B(1 − x)) × (−B).
This effect is, again, driven both by the (weak) concavity of the utility function
u and the fact that in DISPb, parts of the negative consequences occur earlier
and are, thus, discounted less. Therefore, individuals save at most as much in
DISPb8 as in CONCb. The same holds, analogously, for DISPb4 and DISPb2. This
implies that
d?b ≡ x?DISPb − x?CONCb ≤ 0. (3.5)
Since dispersion is greatest in DISPb8 and least pronounced in DISPb2, we
have d?b,8 ≤ d?b,4 ≤ d?b,2 ≤ 0.
The second-to-last payment of CONCb is dispersed over 8, 4, or 2 earlier
periods in DISPb8, DISPb4, and DISPb2, respectively, as is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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Thus, a large share of earlier payments is discounted over fewer periods in DISPb
than in CONCb. This induces subjects to save at most as much in DISPb as in
CONCb.
3.2.2.2 Concentration Bias
In this section, we extend the model of standard discounted utility by incorpo-
rating concentration bias. Concentration bias captures the intuition that concen-
trated consequences are more attention-grabbing than dispersed consequences.
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) proposed a particular weighting function g that cap-
tures such concentration bias. Period-t weights gt scale period-t consumption
utility ut . Individuals are modeled to have focus-weighted utility as follows:
U˜(c,C) ≡
T∑
t=1
gtut(ct).
U˜ has two arguments, c and C , because the weights gt are given by some strictly
increasing weighting function g which, in turn, takes as its argument the differ-
ence between the maximum and minimum possible utility for period t over all
possible earnings sequences in set C :
gt ≡ g[∆t(C)] with ∆t(C) ≡ max
c′∈C ut(c
′
t) − minc′∈C ut(c
′
t).
If the underlying consumption utility function is characterized by discounted
utility, as above, then ut(ct)≡ D(t)u(ct). That is, individuals put more weight
on period t than on period t ′ if the discounted-utility-distance between the best
and worst alternative is larger for period t than for period t ′.
We consider the implications of focus weighting on savings decisions in
CONCa and DISPa first. We will see that the following intuition is captured by
including g in the aggregation of consequences: In CONCa, the positive conse-
quences of being patient are concentrated in the last period and are, therefore,
attention-grabbing. By contrast, in DISPa, the positive consequences of saving
are less tangible, as they are dispersed over several periods.
For CONCa, period-1 utility ranges from u1(1) to u1(1+ B) (x = B or x = 0,
respectively), while period-9 utility ranges from u9(1) to u9(1+ RB). For DISPa,
period-1 utility also ranges from u1(1) to u1(1+ B). However, period-9 utility
now ranges only from u9(1) to u9(1+ RB /8) in DISPa8, to u9(1+ RB /4) in
DISPa4, and to u9(1+ RB /2) in DISPa2. Thus, period-9 utility receives a lower
weight in DISPa than it receives in CONCa, g
CONCa
9 > g
DISPa
9 . In fact, the larger the
degree of dispersion, the smaller is the differencemaxu9 −minu9, and thus the
lower is the weight, i.e., gDISPb29 > g
DISPb4
9 > g
DISPb8
9 . In exchange for this down-
weighting of u9, the preceding periods t
′ (t ′ = 2, . . . , 8 in DISPa8, t ′ = 6,7,8 in
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DISPa4, and t
′ = 8 in DISPa2) receive a larger weight gt ′ in DISPa than in CONCa.
This is because for those periods,maxut ′ −minut ′ = 0 in CONCa, while it is pos-
itive in DISPa. Importantly, g is strictly increasing. If g is sufficiently steep, then
the relatively large weight g9 in CONCa is greater than the sum of the multiple
smaller weights gt ′ , including g9, in DISPa.
Expressed verbally, the positive consequences of being patient are under-
weighted in DISPa relative to CONCa. If this relative underweighting of dis-
persed payoffs in DISPa is sufficiently strong, focus-weighted utility predicts
larger marginal utility from being patient in CONCa than in DISPa. In that case,
the prediction of the standard model—as specified in equation (3.4)—is re-
versed: focus-weighting individuals may want to save more in CONCa than in
DISPa. Let
?? indicate optimal choices according to discounted utility in combina-
tion with focusing (in analogue to ? indicating optimal choices under discounted
utility without focus weighting). Then we have, with a sufficiently positive slope
of the weighting function g,4
d??a ≡ x??CONCa − x??DISPa > 0 (3.6)
as well as d??a,8 ≥ d??a,4 ≥ d??a,2 > 0.
We now turn to the implications of focus-weighted utility on savings deci-
sions in CONCb and DISPb. Recall that in DISPb, the negative consequences of
saving are dispersed over several payment dates, while they are concentrated at
a single, thus attention-grabbing, payment date (t = 8) in CONCb. The strictly
increasing weighting function g captures this potential neglect of the dispersed
payoffs in DISPb. Period-8 utility ranges from u8(1) to u8(1+ B) (for x = B
and x = 0, respectively) in CONCb. By contrast, it ranges only from u8(1) to
u8(1+ B /8) in DISPb8, to u8(1+ B /4) in DISPb4, and to u8(1+ B /2) in DISPb2.
Hence, focus-weighted utility assigns a lower weight to period-8 utility in DISPb
than in CONCb. In exchange for this downweighting of u8, the preceding periods
t ′ (t ′ = 1, . . . , 7 in DISPb8, t ′ = 5,6,7 in DISPb4, and t ′ = 7 in DISPb2) receive
a larger weight gt ′ in DISPb than in CONCb. This is because for those periods,
maxut ′ −minut ′ = 0 in CONCb, while it is positive in DISPb. Just as before, if the
slope of g is sufficiently positive, then the relatively large weight g8 in CONCb is
greater than the sum of the multiple smaller weights gt ′ , including g8, in DISPb.
If such underweighting of the utility generated by early payments (up to pay-
ment date no. 8) is sufficiently strong in DISPb, then focus-weighting reverses
the prediction of the standard model—as stated in equation (3.5)—by predict-
4 The weighting function has to be steep enough to offset any potential effects from discount-
ing, concavity of the per-period utility function, and the interest rate R that might favor the
dispersed payment.
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ing that individuals save more in DISPb than in CONCb:
d??b ≡ x??DISPb − x??CONCb > 0, (3.7)
and d??b,8 ≥ d??b,4 ≥ d??b,2 > 0.
In the following, we compare savings decisions between CONCa and DISPa
as well as between CONCb and DISPb. We hypothesize that concentration bias
is sufficiently strong and leads individuals to save more in CONCa than in DISPa,
d??a > 0, as well as more in DISPb than in CONCb, d
??
b > 0. Both effects taken
together yield the prediction regarding the aggregated concentration bias of
d?? > 0, with d?? being the average of d??a and d
??
b .
Hypothesis 4. Subjects allocate more money to payments that are concentrated at
a single date than to equal-sized payments that are dispersed over multiple earlier
dates, d?? > 0 (in contrast to standard discounting).
Define variables d??j to capture the differences in savings averaged across the
different degrees of dispersion: d??j ≡ (d??a, j + d??b, j) /2 for j = 2,4,8.
Hypothesis 5. The effect described in Hypothesis 4 is the more pronounced, the
more dispersed a payment is, i.e., d??8 > d
??
4 > d
??
2 > 0.
3.2.3 Results
Subjects mademultiple allocation decisions in our experiment. In particular, sub-
jects made several allocation decisions for CONC and DISP earnings sequences.
This allows us to calculate for each individual the average difference of money
allocated to later periods between CONC and DISP earnings sequences. De-
note by xˆ , dˆ, etc. the empirical counterparts of the variables introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2.2 (i.e., of x?/??, d?/??, etc.). That is, dˆ is the individual average of dˆa
(= xˆCONCa − xˆDISPa) and dˆb (= xˆDISPb − xˆCONCb).
3.2.3.1 Test of Hypothesis 4
With this, we can report our first result.
Result 7. On average, subjects allocated more money to payments that were con-
centrated rather than dispersed, i.e., our measure of concentration bias, dˆ, is sig-
nificantly larger than zero.
Our first result supports Hypothesis 4. Subjects allocated dˆ = 6.3 percentage
points (p.p.) more money into payments that were concentrated rather than
dispersed. This treatment effect is statistically significant, suing a t-test, with
standard errors corrected for potential clustering on the subject level (see Ta-
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Table 3.2. Testing Concentration Bias, dˆ , against Zero
Dependent variable dˆ
Estimate 0.063???
(0.011)
Observations 277
Subjects 185
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the subject level.
? p < 0.10, ?? p < 0.05, ??? p < 0.01.
ble 3.2).5 This result provides evidence for concentration bias as predicted by
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013).
A closer look at the specific comparisons between CONCa and DISPa as
well as CONCb and DISPb substantiates our first finding. Subjects allocated
on average more money into the future in CONCa than in DISPa, dˆa = 5.7 p.p.
(= 9.12%), as well as in DISPb than in CONCb, dˆb = 6.8 p.p. (= 9.65%).6 Both
dˆa and dˆb are significantly larger than zero in a t-test (p-value<0.01).
The results reported in Table 3.3 provide further support. Table 3.3 shows
the frequencies of individual values of dˆa and dˆb being smaller, larger, or equal to
zero. A sign-rank test shows that the values of both dˆa and dˆb are not distributed
symmetrically around zero. In both cases, the largest fraction of subjects has
positive dˆa and dˆb values, and there are more than twice as many subjects with
positive than with negative dˆa and dˆb values, respectively.
At the same time, there are seizable fractions of subjects whose dˆa and/or
dˆb values are equal to zero. Let us investigate these subjects’ behavior in greater
detail. Out of 47 subjects with dˆa = 0, four subjects chose xˆCONCa = 0 so that
there was no “room” for them to save even less in the DISP condition, as our
Hypothesis 4 predicts. However, for the remaining 43 subjects, there was “room”
to save less in the dispersed earnings sequences, i.e., to choose xˆDISPa < xˆCONCa
in line with Hypothesis 4—but they did not do so. Thus, for these 43 subjects,
concentration bias does not seem to have mattered.
Regarding the second group, the 51 subjects with dˆb = 0, it turns out that
45 subjects chose xˆCONCb = 1. This means that they were already so patient in
the CONCb condition that their behavior may be confined by a ceiling effect: our
task simply did not allow them to choose xˆDISPb > xˆCONCb , as concentration bias
would have predicted. Thus, it might be that some of these 45 subjects would
have shown an effect if they had been given “room” to do so.
5 This finding is substantiated with a sign-rank test (p < 0.001).
6 xˆCONCa = 68.3%, xˆDISPa = 62.5%, xˆCONCb = 77.3%, and xˆDISPb = 70.5%.
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Table 3.3. Frequencies of the Two Measures of Concentration Bias, dˆa and dˆb, Being
Positive, Zero, or Negative
Difference dˆa dˆb
Positive 63 (45%) 59 (43%)
Zero 47 (34%) 51 (37%)
Negative 29 (21%) 28 (20%)
N 139 138
3.2.3.2 Test of Hypothesis 5
Let us now turn to the question whether the degree of dispersion influences
subjects’ choices, i.e., to testing Hypothesis 5.
Result 8. Our measure of concentration bias is the greater, the more dispersed
payments in the DISP condition are, i.e., dˆ8 > dˆ4 > dˆ2 > 0.
Our second result provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 5. We find that
the degree of concentration bias that subjects exhibit depends on the degree to
which the dispersed payment is actually dispersed. Our measure of concentra-
tion bias is dˆ8 = 8.10 p.p. for 8 payment dates; it is dˆ4 = 6.56 p.p. for 4 pay-
ment dates and dˆ2 = 3.67 p.p. for 2 payment dates. All three treatment effects
are significantly larger than zero according to both t-tests and sign-rank tests
(p < 0.001 for dˆ8 and dˆ4; p < 0.05 for dˆ2 in both tests). Moreover, concentra-
tion bias in the case that payments were dispersed over 4 or 8 payment dates
is significantly greater than when payments were dispersed over on 2 payments
dates. However, the difference between dispersion over 4 or 8 payment dates is
not statistically significant: In an OLS regression, we find that concentration bias
for 8 payment dates is significantly larger than for 2 payment dates (p < 0.01)
but not significantly larger than for 4 payment dates (p = 0.237).
3.2.3.3 Heterogeneity
The model of focusing can be considered as a formalization of a rule of thumb
which people use because, for some reason, they cannot evaluate the whole
situation correctly. One possible reason for applying a heuristic way of thinking
is that people are not cognitively able to evaluate all involved consequences and
therefore focus on some attention-grabbing concentrated payoffs. Alternatively,
they simply do not have the arithmetic skills to aggregate the monetary payoffs
correctly.
Table 3.3 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of con-
centration bias between subjects. It is conceivable that this heterogeneity is re-
lated to heterogeneity in cognitive abilities and/or impulsivity. We therefore try
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Table 3.4. Regression of the Measure of Concentration Bias, dˆ , on a Measure of
Mathematical Ability and CRT Scores
(1) (2)
Dependent variable dˆ dˆ
Math score ≤ median 0.033
(0.021)
CRT score ≤ median 0.023
(0.021)
Constant 0.048??? 0.053???
(0.014) (0.014)
Observations 277 277
Subjects 185 185
R2 0.009 0.004
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the subject level.
? p < 0.10, ?? p < 0.05, ??? p < 0.01.
to measure subjects’ abilities that might be related to such effects by assessing
math skills via an incentivized mental-arithmetic task. In this task, subjects were
given five minutes time to calculate as many sums as they could of decimal num-
bers. These sums were of a similar kind as the monetary payments presented to
subjects in the main experiment. The median subject calculated six sums cor-
rectly.
Moreover, individuals who are less able to control their impulsivity might be
more prone to concentration bias. To assess cognitive reflection, we use the CRT
from Frederick (2005) as a measure of impulsiveness.
For both measures, we perform a median split and set the associated dummy
variable to one for all subjects below the median. We regress our measure of
concentration bias, dˆ, on the dummy for math or CRT. As also evident from
Table 3.4, we do not find any significant influence of these two measures of
heterogeneity on concentration bias.
3.3 Robustness
We have shown above evidence for a bias toward concentrated payments in inter-
temporal choice that is at odds with standard discounting but can be explained
by the focusing model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). In this section, we analyze
potential alternative explanations of the observed behavior that resemble but
are not identical to Kőszegi–Szeidl-type focusing.
These alternative drivers of behavior would have to rely on one of the two
characteristics in which the dispersed and concentrated payments differ from
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each other: First, it might be the case that subjects are averse against small pay-
ments. For instance, subjects may have a distaste against receiving lots of change
(i.e., small coins) rather than bills. While a distaste against small payments
should not matter in the context of our experiment as payments are conducted
though bank transfers, we cannot rule out that subjects feel this way. Second, the
computational complexity of evaluating an earnings sequence is greater when it
includes dispersed and not only concentrated payments. This greater computa-
tional complexity may cause errors in subjects’ calculations. White-noise errors
would only result in inconsistent choices but not in a preference for concentrated
payments. However, it is conceivable for our task that these mathematical errors
are systematic in the direction of “subadditivity”—meaning that people calcu-
late the sum of the dispersed payments to be too small.7 As a consequence, sub-
jects would undervalue dispersed payments vis-à-vis concentrated sequences.
To control for these two potential effects, we made use of a control exper-
iment in which all dispersed payments were “dispersed within a day” and not
over different payment dates. Recall that the last bank transfer of a dispersed
payment in DISPa and DISPb is always completed at the same date as the respec-
tive concentrated payment in CONCa and CONCb. In our “dispersedwithin a day”
control experiment, we therefore mirrored the combined features of the DISP
and CONC conditions: we made the dispersed payments de facto identical to the
concentrated ones, by scheduling all “dispersed” payments on the date of the
concentrated payment. In other words, the “dispersed within a day” payments
are completely equivalent to the concentrated payments except the difference
in the display: subjects saw 2, 4, or 8 relatively small monetary amounts that
they would have to add to calculate the total earnings that they would receive at
that date. Figure 3.5 displays a screenshot of the graphical representation that
was shown to subjects who participated in this control experiment.
Overall, subjects in the control experiment made the same amount of al-
location decisions as subjects in the main experiment did. The only difference
between these decisions was that in the main experiment DISP-type allocation
decisions concern dispersion over multiple payment dates, while in the control
experiment DISP-type allocation decisions concern dispersion within a payment
date, as explained above. Thus, we can calculated the same average difference
of money allocated to “concentrated”—or not dispersed—payments, i.e., dˆ, for
subjects in the control experiment as we did for subjects of the main experiment.
7 There is evidence that people suffer from “left-digit bias”—a “tendency to focus on the left-
most digit of a number while partially ignoring other digits”—even in situations in which they
have monetary incentives to overcome such bias (Lacetera et al., 2012). A left-digit bias could
lead to undervaluation of dispersed compared to concentrated payoffs in our experiment. One
might argue that left-digit bias is a potential “micro-foundation” of Kőszegi and Szeidl’s (2013)
focus weights; however, one might also view left-digit bias and resulting undervaluation of a sum
as a mathematical error that should be ruled out as an explanation.
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Figure 3.5. Budget Sets: Screenshots of a DISPb8 Condition in the Main (top) and in the
Respective Condition in the Control (bottom) Experiment
While dˆ measures concentration bias in the main experiment, it measures small
payments aversion and computational complexity in the control experiment. In
case our estimated measure of dˆ is statistically larger in the main rather than in
the control experiment, then this would imply that the evidence for concentra-
tion bias in the main experiment cannot be explained by small numbers aversion
or computational complexity.
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Table 3.5. Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Concentration Bias, dˆ , in the Main
Experiment (Dispersed over Time) vis-à-vis the Control Experiment (Dispersed within
a Day)
Dependent variables dˆ
Dispersed within a day −0.036???
(0.013)
Constant 0.063???
(0.011)
Observations 562
Subjects 374
R2 0.016
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the subject level.
? p < 0.10, ?? p < 0.05, ??? p < 0.01.
We compare dˆ between our main and control experiments in an OLS re-
gression. This comparison is between subjects and involves overall 374 subjects
of which 185 participated in the main experiment and 189 participated in the
control experiment.8
To compare the main experiment with the control experiment, we regress dˆ
on a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for all subjects who participated
in the (“dispersed within a day”) control experiment instead of the main experi-
ment.9 Hence, the (negative of the) coefficient on this dummy measures to what
extent merely splitting up a larger monetary payment into the sum of multiple
small payments can generate concentration bias. As Table 3.5 shows, the coeffi-
cient on this control dummy is negative and significant on the 1% level. That is,
concentration bias in the main experiment cannot be explained by small num-
bers aversion or computational complexity.
Merely splitting up a larger payment into several smaller ones thus cannot
explain the concentration bias that we observed in our main experiment. This is
additional evidence for the model by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), since according
to this model, the dispersion of consequences over time is crucial in generating
concentration bias.
8 Except for the first three sessions, the main and control experiments were conducted during
the same sessions. In these latter sessions, participants of our study were randomly assigned either
to the main or control experiment.
9We have up to two values for the dependent variable per subject, depending on whether
a subject participated in both the CONCa and DISPa as well as the DISPb and CONCb conditions
or only one of the two. Consequently, we cluster standard errors on the subject level.
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper is the first to provide causal evidence for a bias toward concentrated
payoffs in intertemporal choice, as it is predicted by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013).
Building on the “convex budget sets” method of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012),
we designed a novel choice task that implements different types of intertemporal
budget constraints. More specifically, both earlier and later benefits in this task
take on the form of either one-time payments or payments that are dispersed
over several payments dates. We used this choice task in a laboratory experi-
ment to test how spreading payments over time influences people’s intertempo-
ral decisions. We find that the payments’ degree of dispersion influences subjects’
choices in a way that is incompatible with discounted utility but in line with con-
centration bias, as the Kőszegi–Szeidl model predicts. Our findings are relevant
not only for positive economics, i.e., for understanding and forecasting people’s
behavior, but also for normative economics, as we argue below.
To academic economists as well as politicians and entrepreneurs, how people
make intertemporal decisions is of great interest. For instance, how people’s sav-
ings respond to changes in interest rates or how their health decisions respond
to tax incentives is relevant for both the insurance sector and the government.
The model most widely used for analyzing intertemporal decisions is discounted
utility in combination with exponential discounting. However, people’s decisions
often seem to contradict exponential discounting. One example is low gym at-
tendance (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006). A different example—with huge
monetary stakes—is the “annuity puzzle” (see, e.g., Yaari, 1965; Warner and
Pleeter, 2001; Davidoff et al., 2005; Benartzi et al., 2011). It describes the phe-
nomenon that many people choose an earlier lump-sum payment over a future
rent that is paid periodically (the annuity) evenwhen the rent has a substantially
higher expected present value. In fact, many other decisions from everyday life
are similar in that available options are also characterized by payoffs or costs
that are dispersed over time—such as the benefits of not smoking or payment
plans for smartphones.
Deviations from exponential discounting have frequently been interpreted
as resulting from present bias, i.e., as stemming from a lack of self-control,
which can be formalized via (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting (see, e.g., Laibson,
1997). Recently, Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) have offered an alternative explana-
tion of the departures from exponential discounting that occur in such decisions:
a bias of decision makers toward options whose consequences are concentrated
in fewer periods. Unfortunately, based on empirical data from the field alone,
it will be hard or even impossible to discriminate between the competing ex-
planations. More concretely, the “annuity puzzle” (Benartzi et al., 2011) could
be the product of Kőszegi–Szeidl-type focusing. However, other factors, such as
uninsuredmedical expenses, bequest motives, and adverse selection (see the dis-
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cussions in Modigliani, 1986; Davidoff et al., 2005; Benartzi et al., 2011), may
also, at least partially, explain the empirically observed low degree of annuitiza-
tion. Moreover, the predictions of hyperbolic discounting and the Kőszegi–Szeidl
model coincide regarding under-annuitization.
By providing a controlled environment in which particular motives are ruled
out or at least held constant, our lab experiment allows for establishing that the
dispersion of consequences indeed causally affects discounting. Our variant of
the “convex budget set” method (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012) implements
both concentrated and dispersed payments. In other words, we implement dif-
ferent types of intertemporal budget constraints (different types of “investment
products”/“savings technologies”). For paying subjects, we use forward-dated
money transfers to their bank accounts. In the concentrated conditions (CONCa
and CONCb), each payment is transferred on a single day. In contrast, in the
associated dispersed conditions (DISPa and DISPb), parts of the payments are
dispersed over several days (importantly, these are always earlier than the asso-
ciated CONC payments): in DISPa, later payments are dispersed, while in DISPb,
earlier payments are dispersed.
Concentration bias, as modeled by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), predicts that
subjects allocate more money to future payments (save more) in CONCa than
in DISPa. Importantly, this prediction is not made by discounted-utility models
(i.e., neither by exponential nor by hyperbolic discounting). Indeed, we find that
subjects exhibit concentration bias. Thus, they violate predictions of discounted-
utility models, while their decisions are compatible with the focusing model
by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). Via a control treatment, we show that merely
splitting up a larger payment into several smaller ones cannot explain the con-
centration bias that we observed in our main experiment. This is crucial because
according to Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), it is the dispersion of consequences over
time that generates a bias toward concentration.
Our study contributes to the literature on intertemporal choice in two impor-
tant ways: First, it helps explain why in recent experiments, the observed degree
of present bias and the incidence of time-inconsistent behavior are fairly low
(Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015), while they are found
to be much more severe in the analysis of field data (e.g., low gym attendance,
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006); resistance to the annuitization of pension
plans, Warner and Pleeter (2001) and Davidoff et al. (2005)). Our study does
so by identifying the lack of dispersed payments in previous lab experiments as
a plausible source of this discrepancy. Second, and more importantly, we find
that the dispersion of payments influences subjects’ decisions in a way captured
neither by exponential nor by (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting.
Hence, not only previous experimental studies but also theoretical accounts
of discounting, except Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), seem to have neglected an
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important facet of intertemporal choice. At the same time, our findings are also
evidence against other recent approaches such as the “model of relative thinking”
by Bushong et al. (2015), since relative thinking predicts effects in the opposite
direction of the effects predicted by focusing.
We are aware of one previous study that used multiple bank transfers to re-
munerate subjects: Attema et al. (2015). Attema et al. propose a highly elegant
method of “measuring discounting without measuring utility.” Crucially, how-
ever, their method relies, first, on the assumption that lifetime utility is time-
separable and, second, on measuring indifference between payment streams
that consist of dispersed payments.10 However, the focusing model predicts a vi-
olation of time separability if at least one of the functions u or g is nonlinear.
Furthermore, also without any reference to the focusing model, our results indi-
cate limitations to Attema et al.’s approach. Given that we find that the degree
of an option’s dispersion affects expressed discounting, it is likely that the esti-
mates obtained by applying Attema et al.’s method will be sensitive to the exact
payment streams employed, i.e., to both the size of the payments and their de-
gree of dispersion.
Outside the laboratory, concentration bias is essential information, for in-
stance, regarding the assessment of the effectiveness of policy measures. It is
conceivable, for instance, that taxes on annuities are perceived as less severe by
people than taxes on lump-sum payments or on current income. Related to this,
Chetty et al. (2009) have shown that taxes of different salience affect consumer
demand to different degrees, and they also assess the consequences of this ef-
fect for consumer welfare. Thus, understanding how bias toward concentration
affects people’s intertemporal choices is equally important for both positive and
normative economics.
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Appendix 3.A Instructions
Main and Control Experiment11
Screen 1—Welcome
We would like to ask you to be quiet during the experiment and to use the
computer only for tasks which are part of this experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to you for
help.
Please put your cell phone into the bag at your place.
Screen 2—Information about the Procedure
Part 1
In the first part of this experiment, you will gain nine €1 payments for sure,
which will be transferred to your bank account at various dates in the future.
Furthermore, you receive one or multiple additional payment(s) for the first part
of the experiment. For the latter one you can decide by yourself when these ad-
ditional payment(s) will be transferred. The following is always the case: If you
choose a later payment, you receive, in total, more money than choosing
an earlier payment.
Overall you make 60 decisions about timing and amount of money of your
additional payment(s). After you have made your decisions, one decision will be
randomly picked by the computer and is paid out for real. Since every decision is
picked with the same probability, it is convenient for you to make every decision
as if it were paid out for real.
Your payment for part one will be transferred to your bank account. All or-
ders for transfers will be transmitted to the bank today. We will send you an e-
mail with all the data transmitted to the bank, such that you can check whether
all payments are ordered correctly!
After the last transfer you will receive another e-mail which reminds you of
all different payments and dates.
If you have any question, please raise your hand. We will come to you for
help.
Part 2
In the second part of the experiment, we would like to ask you to exercise a task.
You will receive money for doing this task. We will provide information about
the exact payment right before the beginning of the second part. Your payment
11While the text of the instructions for the main and control experiment are the same, the
income sequences displayed on the respective screens are different, as discussed in Section 3.3.
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for the second part is independent of the payment for the first part and you will
get paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
Screen 3
Here subjects have to enter their banking data.
Screen 4—Choice Lists12
Part 1a
In the first 24 decisions, you have to choose your most preferred option out
of nine possible payment-alternatives. In all of these decisions, you have the
possibility to receive your whole payment earlier in time or, alternatively, in
total more money later in time.
In the following, before the experiment starts, we show you two possible
payment-alternatives of a decision such that you get familiar with the decision
screens of this experiment.
Screen 5—Example 1
In this example, the first alternative has been chosen. The slider is positioned
in a way that payment-alternative 1 is displayed. In this example, payment-
alternative 1 corresponds to a payment of €8 at the earliest possible date. Addi-
tionally, €1 is transferred to your bank account at nine different dates.
Screen 6—Example 2
In this example, the sixth alternative has been chosen. The slider is positioned
in a way that payment-alternative 6 is displayed. In this example, payment-
alternative 6 corresponds to a multiple payment of €1.50 at each highlighted
date. Additionally, €1 is transferred to your bank account at nine different dates.
Screen 7—Example 3
You can choose your preferred option out of nine alternatives. All alternatives
distinguish themselves in the total amount of money and the points in time
where transfers are realised. The following is always the case: If you choose
a later payment, you receive, in total, more money than choosing an earlier
payment.
At the next screen, all nine payment-alternatives of this decision are shown
in an animation.
The transfer dates are highlighted in red.
12We analyze the intertemporal decisions with respect to the the choice lists in Section 3.B.
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After the animation you have the possibility to have another look at all
payment-alternatives and you can choose your most preferred alternative.
This hint will be shown for the first four decisions.
Screen 8—Budget Sets13
In part 1b you have to make 36 decisions.
In each decision you have the possibility to divide a certain amount of money
between earlier and later dates. The less money you allocate to earlier dates,
the more money you receive later. In other words, the total amount of money
received is higher when a bigger part is allocated to later dates.
You make the decisions by using a slider with your mouse.
You can practice the use of the slider:
You move a red marker by moving your mouse over the dark-grey bar (do
not click!). If you click at the red marker, your choice is loged and can be saved
afterwards. There will appear a red Button “Save choice!”. After clicking this
button, your current choice is saved.
If you want to correct a loged choice, click at the red marker again and move
the mouse to your preferred position.
Screen 9—End of Part 1
This was the last decision of the first part of the experiment.
Before you learn which decision from the first part will be paid out for real,
we would like to ask you to take part in the second part of the experiment.
Please click on the button “Continue.”
Screen 10—Part 2
In this part we would like to ask you to add up figures as often as you can
manage.
You have 5 minutes time for exercising this task.
You receive a base payment of €1 for this part.
The more numbers you can sum up correctly, the more money you can gain:
You receive €0.20 for each correct summation.
You have three attempts for each summation. If you are not able to calculate
the sum correctly in the third attempt, you lose €0.05.
(Attention: You have to use a period (.) instead of a comma (,) when writing
decimal numbers.)
13We analyze the intertemporal decisions with respect to the the budget sets in main text of
this paper.
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Screen 11
You have solved X tasks correctly and entered X times a wrong solution in all
three attempts.
You receive €Y for this task. You will receive the money in a few minutes.
Screen 12
The experiment will be over soon. Finally, we would like to ask you to answer
ten questions. After answering these ten questions, you will learn your payment
for the first part and get paid for the second part.
Screen 13—CRT 1
A bat and a ball cost €1.10. The bat costs €1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
Screen 14—CRT 2
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets?
Screen 15—CRT 3
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for
the patch to cover half of the lake?
Appendix 3.B Choice Lists
To show that our findings are not specific for one single method, we use choice
lists as an additional robustness check for Hypothesis 4. Each subject was en-
dowed with 24 choice lists with nine options j = 1, . . . , 9.14 Subjects faced three
different types of choice lists as illustrated in Figures 3.C.1, 3.C.2 and 3.C.3
CONCCL with one concentrated payment for each option j, DISPaCL with an in-
creasing degree of dispersion of the payment and DISPbCL with a decreasing
degree of dispersion. We varied time w (in weeks) between two periods, budget
B (in €) in the first period and interest i (in €) additionally paid when pick-
ing choice j instead of j − 1. In the first wave, each of the (N = 93) subjects
faced 8 earnings sequences (w ∈ {3,6}; B ∈ {8,11}; i ∈ {0.2,0.5}) for CONCCL,
14 As in the budget sets, each option included ninemoney transfers t = 1, . . . , 9 to subjects’ bank
account with €1 fixed payment at each date plus an additional amount of money, depending on
the option chosen.
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DISPaCL and DISPbCL
15. In the second wave, all (N = 92) subjects made 8 deci-
sions (w ∈ {2,3}; B ∈ {8,11}; i ∈ {0.2,0.8}) for CONCCL and DISPaCL and an-
other 8 decisions (w ∈ {4,6}; B ∈ {8,11}; i ∈ {0.2,0.8}) for DISPbCL. As above,
we compare within-subject average choice between CONCCL and DISPaCL, and
CONCCL and DISPbCL, respectively. We consider a choice of a higher option j as
more patient.
Predictions
Discounted Utility
We start with the predictions for standard discounting utility. Individuals com-
pare utilities U(c) of each option c within a choice list C and pick the option
c? with the highest utility. We examine the comparison between CONCCL and
DISPaCL first. In CONCCL, individuals pick the option:
c?CONCCL(B, i) ≡
argmax
j
9∑
t=1,6= j
D(t)u(1) + D( j)u(1 + B + ji), (3.B.1)
and in DISPaCL:
c?DISPaCL(B, i) ≡
argmax
j
j∑
t=1
D(t)u(1 +
B + ( j − 1)i
j
) +
9∑
t= j+1
D(t)u(1). (3.B.2)
When comparing utilities between CONCCL and DISPaCL for some specific
option j, utility for the latter one is always higher due to the (weak) concavity
of the utility function u and a lower degree of discounting for a big part of the
15 Choices with w= 3 could not be used for the analysis, see 3.B.
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dispersed payments:
9∑
t=1,6= j
D(t)u(1) + D( j)u(1 + B + ji)
≤
j∑
t=1
D(t)u(1 +
B + ( j − 1)i
j
) +
9∑
t= j+1
D(t)u(1)
⇐⇒
j−1∑
t=1
D(t)u(1) + D( j)u(1 + B + ji)
≤
j∑
t=1
D(t)u(1 +
B + ( j − 1)i
j
) (3.B.3)
As a consequence, individuals are (weakly) better off in DISPaCL and choose an
at least as patient option as in CONCCL, i.e.,
d?1,C L ≡ c?CONCCL − c?DISPaCL ≤ 0. (3.B.4)
We consider CONCCL and DISPbCL next. Here we use the same concentrated
treatment as benchmark as above. Optimal choice for DISPbCL is:
c?DISPbCL(B, i) ≡
argmax
j
j−1∑
t=1
D(t)u(1) +
9∑
t= j
D(t)u(1 +
B + ( j − 1)i
9 − ( j − 1) ) (3.B.5)
When comparing utility between CONCCL and DISPbCL for some option j, the
(weak) concavity of the utility function u makes the individual in the dispersed
case better off, but, at the same time, payments occur later and are discounted
more strongly. To weaken the second motive, we doubled the time between
consecutive payment dates in DISPbCL.We show in Appendix 3.D that under ex-
ponential discounting and linear utility, individuals should be more patient in
CONCCL than in DISPbCL:
d?2,C L ≡ c?DISPbCL − c?CONCCL ≤ 0. (3.B.6)
Concentration Bias
When investigating predictions of Kőszegi and Szeidl’s concentration bias, note
that each choice list consists of nine possible options which span the utility range
for each period. For CONCCL, minimum possible utility is always ut(1) whereas
maximum possible utility for period t is ut(1+ B + ji) which corresponds to
option j = t. Hence, ∆t(C) differs from u1(1+ B)− u1(1) to u9(1+ B + 8i)−
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u9(1). Whereas for DISPaCL, ∆t(C) differs from u1(1+ B)− u1(1+ B+8i9 ) to
u9(1+
B+8i
9 )− u9(1). As one can see, the relative weighting of the last period
is higher in CONCCL, i.e., g
CONCCL
9 / g
CONCCL
1 > g
DISPaCL
9 / g
DISPaCL
1 . If this under-
weighting is sufficiently strong, focus-weighted utility predicts a less patient
choice in DISPaCL than in CONCCL and one gets
d??1,C L ≡ c??CONCCL − c??DISPaCL > 0 (3.B.7)
We study the implications of focus-weighted utility on the comparison be-
tween CONCCL and DISPbCL next. For DISPbCL —opposite to the increasing
dispersion— is the utility-range of the first period much smaller than for the
last period: u1(1+ B /9)− u1(1) versus u9(1+ B + 8i)− u9(1+ B /9). That re-
sults in a stronger relative overweighting of the last period for DISPbCL, i.e.,
gDISPaCL9 / g
DISPaCL
1 > g
CONCCL
9 / g
CONCCL
1 . Here, if this underweighting is sufficiently
strong, focus-weighted utility predicts a more patient choice in DISPbCL than in
CONCCL:
d??2,C L ≡ d??DISPbCL − d??CONCCL > 0, (3.B.8)
Results
Subjects made multiple allocation decisions in our experiment. In particular,
they made 8 allocation decisions for each of the three different treatments,
CONCCL, DISPaCL and DISPbCL. This allows us to calculate for each individual
the average difference of choices between CONC and DISP earnings sequences.
Denote by cˆ, dˆ the empirical counterparts of the variables introduced above.
We find supportive evidence in both directions for Hypothesis 4. Subjects
chose a lower option of dˆ1,C L = 0.573 in DISPaCL, compared to CONCCL, and
a higher option of dˆ2,C L = 0.933 in DISPbCL than in CONCCL. These treatment
effects are statistically significant in both a t-test and sign-rank test (p < 0.001
according to both tests).
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Appendix 3.C Choice Lists: Schematic Illustrations
w weeks w weeks
t
c = 1: 1
+
B
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 2: 1
+
B + i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 3:
+
B + 2i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 4:
+
B + 3i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 5:
+
B + 4i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 6:
+
B + 5i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 7:
+
B + 6i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 8:
+
B + 7i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c = 9:
+
B + 8i
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 3.C.1. Choice Lists: CONCCL Conditions
Note: For the values of B, i, and w that we used, see Section 3.B.
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9
+
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9
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Figure 3.C.2. Choice Lists: DISPaCL Conditions
Note: For the values of B, i, and w that we used, see Section 3.B.
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Figure 3.C.3. Choice Lists: DISPbCL Conditions
Note: For the values of B, i, and w that we used, see Section 3.B.
76 | 3 Concentration Bias in Intertemporal Choice
Appendix 3.D Choice Lists: Comparison between CONCb and
DISPb
We look at people whose behavior can be described with exponential discount-
ing. We intend to show that those who are patient in the long decreasingly dis-
persed treatment must be patient in the short concentrated treatment, too. For
instance, if someone chooses slider position n in the first treatment, he should
choose at least n in the latter one. We use linear utility and show (numerically)
that there is a bigger interval of possible δs such that option n is chosen over
option n− 1 for the short concentrated treatment than the long decreasingly
dispersed treatment.
Concentrated (short)
Choosing slider position n over n− 1 amounts to:
δn(b + r) > δn−1b ⇔ δ(b + r) > b ⇔ δ > b
b + r
=: δconc ,
where b is the received payoff in period n− 1 and r the interest payment accru-
ing between the two payment dates.
Decreasingly dispersed (long)
Choosing slider position n over n− 1 amounts to (n≥ 2):
9−1∑
i=n−1
(δ2)i
b + r
9 − (n − 1) >
9−1∑
i=n−2
(δ2)i
b
9 − ((n − 1) − 1)
⇔ b + r
b
9 − ((n − 1) − 1)
9 − (n − 1) >
∑8
i=n−2(δ2)i∑8
i=n−1(δ2)i
=
((δ2)n−2 − (δ2)9) /(1 − δ2)
((δ2)n−1 − (δ2)9) /(1 − δ2)
⇔ b + r
b
11 − n
10 − n >
((δ2)n−2 − (δ2)9)
((δ2)n−1 − (δ2)9) .
4How Stable Is Trust?
The Case of Personal Experience
of Unfair and Fair Treatment?
Joint with Florian Zimmermann
4.1 Introduction
Trust is a pervasive feature of human relationships. In economics, trust consti-
tutes a social lubricant for any kind of transactions when contracts are incom-
plete or too costly to be enforced (Arrow, 1974). In particular, trust allows the
realization of (efficiency) gains from trade and cooperation. However, it requires
individuals to make themselves and their resources vulnerable to exploitation by
others.
Ample evidence suggests that trust fosters aggregate social and economic
outcomes (see, e.g., Putnam, 1995; La Porta et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer,
1997; Guiso et al., 2004). Understanding how individuals’ willingness to trust
can be encouraged hence poses important challenges for the social sciences
and has potentially far-reaching implications for policy and workplace design.
Whether individuals trust others is largely determined by an interplay of the
institutional setting—capturing the incentives and constraints that individuals
face—and individual primitives—i.e., beliefs and preferences.1
Traditionally, economic research has focused primarily on institutional fac-
tors. In the case of improving trust, institutions do so by facilitating reputational
? We would like to thank Holger Gerhardt and Simone Quercia for helpful comments.
1 This is not to say that institutions and individual primitives are unrelated entities (see, e.g.,
Greif, 1994).
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concerns, for instance, through feedback mechanisms and competition (see, e.g.,
Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Bolton et al., 2004; Huck et al., 2012).
In general, studying the evolution of beliefs and preferences of individu-
als has recently received increasing interest within economic research, as ac-
cumulating evidence suggests substantial heterogeneity of individual primitives
within institutional settings.2 An important first step in shedding light on the
long term evolution of trust is provided by Dohmen et al. (2012), who docu-
ment the transmission of trust attitudes from parents (and local peers) to chil-
dren through both genetic predisposition and socialization (see also Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011).
However, surprisingly little is known about the short-term malleability of in-
dividuals’ willingness to trust others (beyond institutional forces). In this paper,
we study exactly this. We investigate potential nonstandard spillover effects of
social interactions on trust.3 More precisely, we test whether trust is affected by
prior personal experiences of unfair and fair treatment caused by an unrelated
third party. Our approach to study the malleability of trust through such exoge-
nous spillover effects is motivated by the following two observations. First, indi-
vidual behavior is embedded in a constant flux of social interactions that poten-
tially cause personal experiences of unfair and fair treatment. Second, personal
experiences are often powerful and particularly meaningful events to individu-
als, with the consequence that when “people go through experiences, frequently
their loyalties, or their values, change” (Akerlof, 1983).4
We designed a laboratory experiment that allows us to provide causal evi-
dence on the question whether trust behavior is fostered or mitigated by prior
experiences of unfair and fair treatment. We measured trust behavior by em-
ploying a variant of Berg et al.’s (1995) trust game (TG).5 We implemented the
personal experience of unfair and fair treatment by conducting a production dic-
tator game (DG) ahead of the TG. The recipients of the DG were the first movers
of the TG. Dictator subjects either shared or did not share money with their ran-
2 For instance, Falk et al. (2015) show substantial within-country heterogeneity in preferences
(and trust attitudes) that is greater than the corresponding between-country heterogeneity, based
on a globally representative dataset.
3Nonstandard means that standard economic models, e.g., based on rational learning, would
not predict these spillover effects.
4 Suggestive evidence for how profound the influence of personal experiences potentially is,
is provided by Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), who show
that the historical macroeconomic environment affects individuals stock market participation and
preferences for redistribution even decades later.
5 Variants of this trust game have been at the center of a vast literature showing that trust
behavior is reducible to certain economic primitives: beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of the
involved parties (Costa-Gomes et al., 2014); preferences with respect to “social risk taking,” e.g.,
risk and betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004); and preferences with respect to the
outcomes and anticipated actions of others (Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006). See, for instance,
Fehr (2009) for an overview on trust.
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domly matched first movers. First movers hence experienced either unfair or
fair treatment before they entered the TG. This allows us to cleanly identify the
effect of unfair versus fair treatment on their willingness to trust. Importantly,
every first mover knew the frequency with which all first movers overall got paid
or did not get paid. This allows us to rule out rational learning from belief up-
dating as an explanation for a potential treatment effect.
We find a strong spillover effect of fair versus unfair treatment on trust behav-
ior. Subjects who experienced fair treatment in the DG, prior to the TG, showed
a greater willingness to trust on the intensive and extensive margin than sub-
jects who experienced unfair treatment. More precisely, first movers entrusted
more than twice as much of their endowment after a fair than an unfair treat-
ment. This treatment effect is statistically significant and cannot be explained by
income effects or income-related mood and disappointment effects, as we show
through a control experiment.
Our results suggest that heterogeneity in experiences of fair and unfair treat-
ment may lead to differences in individuals’ willingness to trust (within insti-
tutional settings). They also imply that in designing policies and workplaces,
one should pay attention to spillover effects of social interactions in order to im-
prove short-term trust. While it remains to be shown whether and how long such
spillover effects last, we conjecture that an accumulation of experiencing fair or
unfair treatment may generate substantial differences in individuals’ long-term
trust.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the experi-
mental design in Section 4.2 and show the empirical results of the experiments
in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 concludes with a discussion of our results.
4.2 Experimental Design
Wedesigned themain experiment to allow for a precisemeasurement of subjects’
willingness to trust following an experience of unfair or fair treatment. Between
two experimental conditions, UF and F, we exogenously varied whether subjects,
who conducted a real-effort task, were paid for this task by a peer subject (F) or
were not paid (UF). Despite the fact that subjects knew that 50% got paid for
the real-effort task and the remaining 50% were not paid, those who actually
got paid for their effort provision experienced fair treatment, while receiving
no payment constituted an experience of unfair treatment. A between-subject
comparison of subjects’ willingness to trust after they were paid versus not paid
allows us to identify the effect of experiencing fair versus unfair treatment on
trust.
Additionally, we designed a control experiment to measure subjects’ willing-
ness to trust following an experience of bad luck versus luck. Subjects in the con-
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trol experiment also conducted a real-effort task, but here, whether they were
paid or not was determined by a coin toss. Thus, some subjects were paid (exper-
imental condition L) and some subjects were not paid (BL). A between-subject
comparison of subjects’ willingness to trust in the control experiment allows us
to identify potential income effects or income-related mood and disappointment
effects on trust.
Our main focus is to compare the treatment effect of the main experiment
to the control experiment. This difference-in-difference approach tests whether
the experience of fair versus unfair treatment exceeds potential income effects
or income-related mood and disappointment effects.
4.2.1 Main Experiment
We randomly assigned subjects to distinct roles—dictator, first mover, and sec-
ond mover—into groups of three. In the first stage of the experiment, the dicta-
tor subjects and first-mover subjects participated in a production dictation game.
In the second stage, the first and second movers participated in a trust game.
Only the first movers participated in both games. We call these subjects first
movers because of their role in the trust game. In the production dictator game,
however, they were assigned the receiver role. The dictator and second movers
did not know about the game they did not participate in. The first-mover sub-
jects were made aware of this. They knew that no dictator subject could also
be a second-mover subject. This allows us to investigate spillover effects of un-
related social interactions on trust rather than revenge motives.
4.2.1.1 Production Dictator Game Stage
In the production DG, the dictator subjects and the first-mover subjects were
paired randomly in groups of two. Within each group, both subjects worked on
a real-effort task. The real-effort task required subjects to type multiple com-
binations of letters and numbers, e.g., Ldh24tHuixY5Th21o7FzTT35, into the
keyboard. Subjects had as much times as they needed to correctly type 10 dif-
ferent combinations. Completing the real-effort task—which was achieved by
every subject—generated €5, respectively, that were stored in a shared virtual
account. The dictator subjects could choose to keep the entire amount of money
in the account (€10) for themselves or split it with the first mover. Depending
on the dictator subjects’ decision, the first movers either received €5 or received
no payment at all.6
Importantly, after the first-mover subjects were told whether they received
€5 or not, they learned the frequency with which first-mover subjects received
6Note that we did not ask first-mover subjects whether they wanted to complete the real-effort
task.
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the €5 payment or not: in 50% of all cases, first-mover subjects received the €5
payment and in 50% of all cases, first-mover subjects received no payment. In
case a first mover received €5 (no payment), she knew that she belonged to the
fortunate (unfortunate) half of the first-mover subjects.
By telling first movers about the relative frequencies with which first movers
received €5 or not, we designed the experience of fair and unfair treatment to
contain the same information about the distribution of “selfish” and “unselfish”
subjects in the pool. Rational first movers who experienced fair treatment can-
not hold the belief that it is more likely to encounter “unselfish” subjects later
on in the experiment than rational first movers who experienced unfair treat-
ment. First movers in both experimental conditions knew that 50% of all them
received €5 and 50% did not. Therefore, any difference in behavior following
the experience of fair versus unfair treatment cannot be explained by rational
learning from the respective personal experiences. In that sense, our treatment
manipulation allows us to focus on the effect of a personal experience of unfair
versus fair treatment.
To be able to provide first movers with the information on the relative fre-
quency with which first movers received the €5 or not, we did the following.
Dictator subjects took part in the production dictator game at an earlier date
than the first movers. Thus, when the first movers participated in the produc-
tion dictator game, all dictator decisions were already documented—allowing
us to administer them to the first movers.
4.2.1.2 Trust Game Stage
In the TG, first and second movers were paired randomly in groups of two.
Within each group, both first- and second-mover subjects were endowed with
€5. In a sequential setup, the first-mover subjects first sent any amount of money
between €0 and €5 (in 10-cent intervals) to their respective second-mover sub-
ject. The amount received by the second movers was doubled. Second movers
then decided how much money they would like to send back. The second mover
could send back any amount out of the sum of their endowment and the dou-
bled amount sent to them by the first movers. For instance, if a first mover send
€5, the second mover could sent back any amount between €0 and €15. In case
a first mover send 50 cents, the second mover could send back any amount be-
tween €0 and €6.
The amount sent by the first movers measures their willingness to trust their
second movers. This entrusted amount will be behavioral outcome of interest in
the empirical anaylsis in Section 4.3.
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4.2.1.3 Experiencing Fair and Unfair Treatment
We combine the production dictator game and the trust game to test whether
the experience of fair versus unfair treatment affects howmuch first movers trust
second movers. Thereby, we label receiving no money in the production dictator
game as an experience of unfair treatment. Both the dictator and the first mover
had to work equally hard in the production game, making equal sharing of the
produced €10 the salient fairness benchmark. First movers that do not receive
their fair share of the produced €10 experience this as being treated unfairly
by their dictator subjects, as has been found by numerous previous studies on
the (production) DG (for instance, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ock-
enfels, 2000; Konow, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Cappelen et al., 2007;
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Krupka and Weber, 2013).
4.2.2 Control Experiment
The control experiment differed from the main experiment only in one respect.
The first stage was not a production DG but a real-effort task in which a coin toss
determined whether first movers were paid €5 (L condition or “Luck” condition)
or not paid (BL or “Bad Luck” condition ) for their provided effort. Thus, instead
having a dictator decide whether first movers were paid for the real-effort task,
first movers in the control experiment were paid based on pure luck. Essentially,
first movers played a production DG with the computer instead of a dictator.
After first movers in the control experiment experienced luck or bad luck, they
moved on to the TG and were randomly matched with second-mover subjects.7
By removing nothing more than the origin of the choice that determined
whether first movers got paid, we kept the potential for income effects and
income-related mood or disappointment effects constant between experiments.
After all, first movers provided the same effort in the main and control experi-
ment and in both experiments did only half of the subjects receive a payment
for the exerted effort. A comparison of treatment effects on trust between exper-
iments, therefore, allows us to identify the net effect of experiencing an unfair
versus fair treatment.
4.2.3 Procedure
Both experiments were conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn
in spring (main experiment) and summer (control experiment) of 2014. Both ex-
periments in this paper were computerised using softwares z-Tree, ORSEE, and
BoXS (Fischbacher (2007) and Greiner (2004), and Seithe (2012)). In total, 258
subjects participated in the main experiment (96 dictators, 96 first movers and
7 See Section 4.2.1.2 for a description of the TG.
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Figure 4.1. Average of Entrusted Amounts per Experiments and Conditions
96 second movers), and 182 subjects participated in the control experiment (91
first movers and 91 second movers). Because of software malfunction, data are
missing for a single first mover from the trust game of the main experiment. Av-
erage earnings were €7.50 for dictator subjects, €4.50 for first movers and €7.10
for second movers. First movers earned on average less than their endowment.
This finding is in line with what other studies find (see, for instance Camerer,
2003; Ashraf et al., 2006).
4.3 Results
In the following, we focus the amounts of money entrusted by the first movers.8
Figure 4.1 shows the average entrusted amounts per experiments and condi-
tions and reveals a substantial treatment effect on trust in the main experiment
and an, at most, small treatment effect in the control experiment. In Section
4.3.1, we show that the treatment effect on trust is statistically significant in the
main experiment and present a second finding regarding the extensive margin
of entrusting money. In Secton 4.3.2, we continue with the findings of the con-
trol experiment, present a difference-in-difference analysis that tests whether
the treatment effect on trust is larger in the main relative to the control experi-
8We do not discuss the second movers’ choices in this paper, since our primary interest is how
the fair versus unfair treatment experiences affect first movers’ behavior. As the average payoff for
first movers is below their endowment of €5, see Section 4.2.3, sending money to second movers
does not pay off on average in our TGs. This finding is in line with what other studies on TGs find
(see, for instance, Camerer (2003), and Ashraf et al. (2006)).
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Figure 4.2. Frequencies of Entrusted Amounts in the Main Experiment per Condition
ment, and discuss whether the main treatment effect is driven by fair or unfair
treatment experiences.
4.3.1 Results of the Main Experiment
First-moving subjects who were paid by their dictator subjects for the real-effort
task sent on average approximately half of their endowment (€2.49) to the sec-
ond mover in the trust game, while first-moving subjects that were not paid sent
less than a quarter of their endowment (€1.13). The difference in the entrusted
amount of money is €1.36, which represents a substantial marginal effect of
120% when comparing the experience of unfair treatment to the experience of
fair treatment. This treatment effect on trust is statistically significant in an OLS
regression (see Table 4.1, Column 1 and Row 1).
Result 9. First movers sent on average more than twice as much money to their
respective second mover after experiencing fair treatment rather than unfair treat-
ment.
Figure 4.2 shows the histograms of amounts of money entrusted by first
movers. The upper panel shows the histogram for the UF condition, and the
lower panel shows the histogram for the F condition. A comparison of the two
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Table 4.1. Comparing Treatment Effects on Trust between Main and Control Experiment
OLS: Logit:
Entrusted Amount Entrusted Amount > 0
(1) (2)
1 if Not Paid −1.36*** −1.14**
(0.30) (0.51)
1 if Control Experiment −0.92*** −0.95*
(0.34) (0.52)
1 if Not Paid and Control 1.07** 1.17*
(0.46) (0.68)
Constant 2.49*** 1.74***
(0.27) (0.41)
Observations 186 186
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.09 0.03
Notes: In Column 1, we regress the entrusted amount on a condition dummy (= 1 for UF or BL),
an experiment dummy (= 1 for the control experiment) and an interaction variable between the
two dummies. In Column 2, a logistic regression on a different dependent variable—whether the
entrusted amount was larger than €0 (= 1) or not (= 0)—repeats the analyses of Column 1. We
state (robust) standard errors in parentheses. Significant at the 1 (5) [10] percent level: *** (**)
[*].
histograms provides further support for Result 9. While only 7 first movers did
not send any money and only 9 subjects sent less than €1 to their respective
second movers after experiencing fair treatment, 17 first movers did not send
any money and 26 subjects sent less than €1 after experiencing unfair treatment.
The likelihood that first movers sent a positive amount of money is larger in the
F condition rather than the UF condition. This treatment effect is statistically
significant in a logistic regression (see Table 4.1, Column 2 and Row 1).
Result 10. The likelihood of first movers sending a positive amount of money to
their respective second mover is significantly larger after experiencing fair rather
than unfair treatment.
4.3.2 Main versus Control Experiment
We now turn to the control experiment. Figure 4.3 reveals that first movers sent
fairly similar amounts of money to their respective second movers in both L and
BL conditions. On average, unlucky first movers (condition BL) sent €0.29 less
than lucky first movers (condition L). This treatment effect is not statistically
significant in an OLS regression (p < 0.397) and significantly smaller relative to
the treatment effect of the main experiment (see Table 4.1, Column 1 and Row
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Figure 4.3. Frequencies of Entrusted Amounts in the Control Experiment per Condition
3). Figure 4.3 also reveals that the likelihood that first movers sent a positive
amount of money is similar between L-BL conditions in the control experiment.
The treatment effect on the likelihood to send positive amounts in the main
experiment is significantly (albeit weakly) larger than in the control experiment
(see Table 4.1, Column 2 and Row 3).
Result 11. The treatment effects addressed in Results 9 and 10 are significantly
more pronounced in the main experiment relative to the control experiment.
Figure 4.1 and a comparison of Figures 4.2 and 4.3 alludes to the conclusion
that the fair treatment experience drives the treatment effect in the main exper-
iment rather than the unfair treatment experience. Unfairly treated first movers
seem to behave similarly to first movers from the control experiment. Since we
ran the two experiments at two different points in time, we cannot rule out that
this conclusion merely results from a level shift in trust do to some temporal
shock on students trust.
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4.4 Discussion
Our results show a substantial effect of personally experiencing unfair versus
fair treatment on subjects’ willingness to trust others. Result 11 reveals that
this treatment effect on trust cannot be explained by income effects or income-
related mood and disappointment effects. Additionally, we can rule out rational
learning explanations, as we told first movers in the main experiment about the
relative frequencies of dictator behavior before they entered the TG (see Section
4.2.1.1).
Based on these findings, policy makers and workplace designers who are in-
terested in promoting trust should keep spillover effects from unrelated personal
experiences in mind. By encouraging fairness between individuals, trust may be
fostered as a welcomed side effect and virtuous circles may be initiated.9
Personal experiences of fair versus unfair treatment may affect individuals’
trust because of the following reasons. First, individuals overweight personally
experienced states of the world. In particular, fairly treated first movers may
overweight—relative to the rational benchmark—the likelihood of being fairly
treated again in the near future. Second, indirect reciprocity urges individuals
to “respond in kind” to others based on previous interactions with someone else.
In the experiment, fairly treated first movers may want to respond indirectly in
kind to dictator behavior by offering the second mover efficiency gains from the
TG.
Our design does not allow us to differentiate between the two accounts in
terms of which one is driving our results. This remains to be an interesting ques-
tion for future research.
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Appendix 4.A Instructions
Main experiment, first mover, F [UF] condition
Production Dictator Game
This experiment consists of two parts. Your payments for part 1 and part 2 are
independent of each other. You get paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
You participate with a different subject in each part of the experiment.
A participant is randomly assigned from a group of participants to partici-
pate with you in part 1. Your participant only participated in part 1 and has no
knowledge regarding part 2. Your participant took part in part 1 at an earlier
date and is not present in the laboratory today.
A participant from another group of participants is randomly assigned to
participate with you in part 2. Your participant in part 2 participated only in
part 2 and has no knowledge regarding part 1. Your participant in part 2 took
part in part 2 at an earlier date and is not present in the laboratory today.
Please note that: First, the groups from which your first and your second
participant are randomly chosen from are not identical. No member from one
group is also amember in the other group. Second, youwill never know anything
about your two participants and your identify is not revealed to anyone in this
experiment.
[next screen]
Part 1
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Your task and the task of your first participant is to type combinations of
numbers and letters into the keyboard.
For instance: Ldh24tHuixY5Th21o7FzTT35
You will see combinations of numbers and letters on your screen. Type
these numbers and letters one by one into the entry field below and do this
case-sensitive. After you have typed a combination into the keyboard, press the
“continue”-button. After you have typed a combination into the keyboard and
pressed the button, a new combination appears.
[next screen]
For you:
You receive 25 cents for any correctly typed combination. You need to ac-
cumulate €2.50 and you have as much time as you need to do so. You cannot
accumulate more or less than €2.50. The experiment will not continue unless
you have accumulated €2.50.
For your participant:
Your participant also accumulated €2.50, not more and not less.
Shared account:
Both amounts of money are stored in a shared account. The conductors of the
experiment double this amount such that €10 are stored in your joint account.
[next screen]
Your payment:
As explained above, €10 are on your joint account.
Your participant will decide how the €10 are shared between the two of
you. Your participant can allocate the money fairly such that both of you receive
€5. Your participant can also allocate the money unfairly such that both your
participant receives the entire €10 receive.
As explained above, your participant already took part in this experiment at
an earlier date. Thus, your participant has already decided how to allocate the
€10. Your participate has already decided whether you receive €5 or whether
you receive no payment at all.
Comprehension question: Which amount of money cannot be earned by you
in part 1? €0 or €2.50 or €5.00.
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[next screen]
Before you will be made aware that you do or do not receive €5, we would
like you to accumulate €2.50 in the typing-task.
[next screen]
typing-task
[next screen]
Thank you for accumulating €2.50. Your participant has also accumulated
€2.50. Additionally, the conductors of the experiment added another €5 to your
joint account such that €10 are on your joint account.
You will be informed how much money your participant shared with you on
the next screen.
[next screen]
Your participant has allocated the €10 such that you receive €5 [0]. There-
fore, your payoff for part 1 is €5 [0].
Please notice that your participate was randomly assigned to you from a
group of potential participants. In this group of potential participants 48 out of
96 shared the €10 evenly and 48 out of 96 kept the entire €10 for themselves.
Trust Game
[next screen]
In part 2 you and your participant receive two different roles: You are the
sender. Your second participant is the re-sender. The both of you receive an en-
dowment of €5. Part 2 has two stages.
Stage 1:
In stage 1 you can send an amount of money to the re-sender. You can send
any amount of money between €0 and €5 in steps of 10 cents. You can send €0,
10 cents, 20 cents, 30 cents, . . . , 90 cents, €1, . . . , €4.80, €4.90, €5. The amount
of money that you send will be doubled by the conductors of the experiment.
For instance, if you send €2.40, then the re-sender will receive €4.80, and if you
send €0, your re-sender receives €0.
Stage 2:
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In stage 2 the re-sender is asked to send back an amount of money to you.
This amount is doubled. The re-sender chooses an amount between €0 and the
sum of his endowment and the doubled amount that you send in the first stage.
Payments:
You will receive: 5 − Amount that you send to the re-sender + Amount that
the re-sender sends back to you.
The re-sender receives: 5+ 2×Amount that you send to the re-sender−Amount
that the re-sender sends back to you.
Example:
Consider the case that you send €2.40, then the re-sender received €4.80.
The re-sender can send an amount of money between €0 and €9.80 back to you.
For instance, the re-sender could send €3.60 back to you such that the overall
amounts is shared fairly between the two of you which means that you both
receive €6.20.
However, the re-sender could also behave unfairly and not send any amount
of money back to you. In this case you would receive 5 − 2.40 = €2.60 and the
re-sender would receive €9.80.
Please notice that if you do not send any money to the re-sender, your pay-
ment for part 2 of the experiment will be €5.
[next screen]
Which amount of money do you want to send to the re-sender?
Control experiment, first mover, L [BL] condition
Production Lottery
This experiment consists of two parts. Your payments for part 1 and part 2 are
independent of each other. You get paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
You participate with a different subject in part 2 of the experiment.
A participant from another group of participants is randomly assigned to
participate with you in part 2. Your participant in part 2 participated only in
part 2 and has no knowledge regarding part 1. Your participant in part 2 took
part in part 2 at an earlier date and is not present in the laboratory today.
Please note that: You will never know anything about your participant and
your identify is not revealed to anyone in this experiment.
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[next screen]
Part 1
Your task is to type combinations of numbers and letters into the keyboard.
For instance: Ldh24tHuixY5Th21o7FzTT35
You will see combinations of numbers and letters on your screen. Type
these numbers and letters one by one into the entry field below and do this
case-sensitive. After you have typed a combination into the keyboard, press the
“continue”-button. After you have typed a combination into the keyboard and
pressed the button, a new combination appears.
[next screen]
For you:
You receive 25 cents for any correctly typed combination. You need to ac-
cumulate €2.50 and you have as much time as you need to do so. You cannot
accumulate more or less than €2.50. The experiment will not continue unless
you have accumulated €2.50.
Your account:
Yourmoney is stored in an account. The conductors of the experiment double
this amount such that €5 are stored in the account.
[next screen]
Your payment:
As explained above, €5 are on the account.
Whether you will receive the €5 will be determined randomly. You could
receive the entire €5 or you could receive no payment at all.
Comprehension question: Which amount of money cannot be earned by you
in part 1? €0 or €2.50 or €5.00.
[next screen]
Before you will be made aware that you do or do not receive €5, we would
like you to accumulate €2.50 in the typing-task.
[next screen]
typing-task
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[next screen]
Thank you for accumulating €2.50. The conductors of the experiment added
another €2.50 to your account such that €5 are on your account.
You will be informed how whether you were randomly selected to receive
the €5 or not on the next screen.
[next screen]
The computer randomly chose that you receive €5 [0] for part 1. Therefore,
your payoff for part 1 is €5 [0].
Please notice that whether you earned €5 or not was randomly determined.
You can think of it as if a ball was was drawn from an urn. In the urn were 96
balls. 48 balls were red and 48 were blue. If a red ball would have been drawn,
then you had received €5. If a blue ball would have been draw, then you had
received €0. In your case, a red [blue] ball was drawn randomly.
Trust Game
Like in Section 4.A
